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Introductory note 
1. This is the fourth of a series of reports on the topic 
of jurisdictional immunities of States and their prop-
erty, prepared and submitted by the Special Rapporteur 
for consideration and deliberation by the International 
Law Commission. The series was preceded by an 
earlier study presented by the Working Group on the 
topic in July 1978 in the form of an exploratory report. l 
2. It may be helpful to recall briefly that the first of 
the series of reports on the subject was a preliminary 
report2 giving a historical sketch of international 
efforts towards codification examining the sources of 
international law and possible contents of the law of 
State immunities, including the practice of States, 
international conventions, international adjudication, 
and opinions of writers as source materials, and an 
inquiry into initial questions, definitions, a viable in-
ductive approach, the general rule of State immunity 
and possible exceptions to the general rule or limita-
tions of State immunities, immunities from attachment 
and-execution as well as other procedural questions and 
related matters. 
3. The second report of the Special Rapporteur, 
submitted to the Commission at its thirty-second ses-
sion, in 1980,3 and the third report, to its thirty-third 
session, in 1981,4 have each in tum been discussed by 
members of the Commission and have also received 
extensive consideration and been the object of de-
liberation the Sixth Committee during the thirty-fifth 
I A/CN.4/L.279/Rev.l, reproduced in part in Yearbook . .. 1978, 
vol. II (Part Two), pp. 153-155. 
2 Yearbook ... 1979, vol. II (Part One), p. 227, document 
A/CN.4/323. 
3 Yearbook ... 1980, vol. II (Part One), p. 199, document 
A/CN.4/331 and Add.l; for the discussion in the Commission, see 
Yearbook . .. 1980, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 138-141, paras. 111-122. 
4 Yearbook ... 1981, vol. II (Part One), p. 125, document 
A/CN.4/340 and Add.l; for the discussion in the Commission, see 
Yearbook . .. 1981, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 154 et seq., paras. 
208-227. 
and thirty-sixth sessions of the General Assembly. 5 
They have each been preJ?ared with the guidance of the 
Commission6 on the baSIS of comments and observa-
tions of its members, as well as the views expressed by 
representatives of Governments within the Sixth 
COmmittee.7 
4. The second and third reports contain altogether 
eleven draft articles, of which articles 1-5 form part I, 
entitled "Introduction", and articles 6-11-now recon-
stituted in five articles numbered 6-10-form part II, 
entitled "General principles". Of these eleven draft 
articles, the Commission has adopted provisionally, 
with the commentaries thereto,8 artIcle 1 (Scope of the 




Ankle 1. SeoiH of 1M prtSeltl articles 
The present articles apply to questions relating to the immunity of 
one State aud its property from the jurisdiction of another State. 
S See "Topical summary, prepared by the Secretariat, o.f ~he 
discussion in the Sixth Committee on the report of the Commission 
during the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly" 
(A/CN.4/L.326), paras. 311-326; and "Topical summary, prepared 
by the Secretariat, of the discussion in the Sixth Committee on the 
report of the Commission during the thirty-sixth session of the 
General Assembly" (A/CN.4/L.339), paras. 156-179. 
6See Yearbook . .. 1979, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 1~186, paras. 
166-183; Yearbook . .. 1980, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 139-141, paras. 
114-122. 
7 See footnote 5 above. 




Arliek 6. SItIU iIIuruuIity 
I. A State is Immune from the JuriIdic:tioD f1I uotber State ill 
eccordaDc:e with the provisions f1I the preseot m1icIa. 
2. Beet IbaII be &ivea to State Immllllity ill acconIaDce with the 
prorilioas f1I the preseot m1icIa. 
5. Other draft articles in part I (Introduction) are 
article 2 (Use of terms),9 article 3 (Interpretative 
provisions),IO article 4 (Jurisdictional immunities not 
within the sco~ of the present articles)lI and article 5 
(Non-retroactivity of the present articles).12 
9 "Article 2. Use of terms 
"I. For the purposes of the present articles: 
"(a) 'immunity' means the privilege of exemption from, or 
suspension of, or non-amenability to, the exercise of jurisdiction by 
the competent authorities of a territorial State; 
"(b) 'jurisdictional immunities' means immunities from the 
jurisdiction of the judicial or administrative authorities of a 
territorial State; 
"(c) 'territorial State' means a State from whose territorial 
juriSdiction immunities are claimed by a foreign State in respect of 
Itself or its property; 
"(d) 'foreign State' means a State a~ainst which legal proceed-
ings have been initiated within the Jurisdiction and under the 
internal law of a territorial State; 
"(e) 'State property' means propertr, rights and interests which 
are owned by a State according to its mternallaw; 
"~ 'tradmg or commercial activity' means: 
"i a regular course of commercial conduct, or 
"(li a particular commercial transaction or act; 
"CR 'jurisdiction' means the competence or power of a terri-
tori81 State to entertain legal proceedings, to settle disputes, or to 
adjudicate litigations, as well as the power to administer justice in 
all its aspects. 
"2. The provisions of I?aragraph 1 regarding the use of terms in 
the present articles are Without prejudice to the use of those terms 
or to the meaning which may be ascribed to them in the internal 
law of any State or by the ruJes of any international organization." 
10 "Article 3. 11IIerpretllJive provisions 
1. "In the context of the present articles, unless otherwise 
provided, 
"(a) the el9'ression 'foreign State', as defined in article 2, 
paragraph l(d) above, includes: 
"(i) the sovereign or head of State, 
"(ii) the central government and its various organs or depart-
ments, 
"(iii) political subdivisions of a foreign State in the exercise of its 
sovereign authority, and 
"(iv) agencies or instrumentalities acting as organs of a foreign 
State in the exercise of its sovereign authority, whether or 
not endowed with a separate legal personality and whether 
or not forming part of the operational machinery of the 
central government. 
"(b) the expreSSion 'jurisdiction', as defined in article 2, para-
graph 1(g) above, includes: 
"(i~ the power to adjudicate, 
"(ii the power to determine questions of law and of fact, 
"(iii the power to administer justice and to take appropriate 
measures at all sta~es of legal proceedings, and 
"(iv) such other admirustrative and executive ~wers as are 
normally exercised by the judicial, or administrative and 
police authorities of the territorial State. 
"2. In determining the commercial character of a trading or 
commercial activity as defined in article 2, paragraph 1(!) above, 
reference shall be made to the nature of the course of conduct or 
particular transaction or act, rather than to its purpose." 
11 "Article 4. Jurisdictional immunities not within 
the scope of the present articles 
"The fact that the present articles do not apply to jurisdictional 
immunities accorded or extended to 
"(i) diplomatic missions under the Vienna Convention on Dip-
lomatic Relations of 1961, 
"(ii) consular missions under the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations of 1963, 
"(iii) special missions under the Convention on Special Missions of 
1969, 
~ ~.:=p.= ....... ~ 
201 
6. In addition to the commentaries thereto included 
in the report of the Commission,13 draft articles 1 and 6 
have drawn some further comments. The compromise 
formulas such as the expression "Questions relating to" 
in draft article 1 and the phrase "in accordance with the 
provisions of the present articles" in draft article 6, 
paragraphs 1-2, are open to review at a subsequent 
sta~e, as the draft articles have been adopted pro-
viSionally to allow the work of the Special Rapporteur 
to proceed. At the suggestion of the Special Rappor-
teur, the Commission agreed to defer consideration of 
draft articles 2-5 until it was in a position to examine 
the remainder of the draft articles to be proposed on 
the topic. It was noted that draft articles 4-5 were 
submitted to serve as temporary signposts for the 
framework of the projected plan of the draft articles. 14 
It has also become apparent from subsequent debate 
and decisions of the Commission that some of the 
provisions of draft article 2 (Use of terms), especiall,Y 
the expressions "territorial State" and "foreign State' , 
have been abandoned, while the need for further 
clarification in draft article 3 (Interpretative provisions) 
may depend on the desirability of putting some of its 
provisions elsewhere, such as in the revised draft article 
7, paragraph 3.15 
7. Draft article 6 (State immunity), provisionally 
adopted by the Commission with commentary as the 
first article in part II (General principles), has con-
tinued to draw further comments 10 the Sixth Commit-
tee durin~ subsequent sessions of the General 
Assembly, 6 especially as the main general principle 
preceding further draft articles in part II. Many sugges-
tions have been made regarding alternative formulation 
of the draft article, and these should be considered by 
the Drafting Committee and the Commission itself in 
the course of its thirty-fourth session. 
8. The new wording of draft article 7 (Obligation to 
give effect to State immunity),17 article 8 (Consent of 
"(iv) the representation of States under the Vienna Convention on 
the Representation of States in their Relations with Inter-
national Organizations of a Universal Character of 1975, 
"(v) permanent missions or delegations of States to international 
organizations in general. 
"shall not affect: 
"(a) the legal status and the extent of jurisdictional immunities 
recognized and accorded to such missions and representation of 
States under the above-mentioned conventions; 
"(b) the application to such missions or representation of States or 
international organizations of any of the rules set forth in the present 
articles to which they would also be subject under international law 
inde~ndently of the articles; 
"( c) the application of any of the ruJes set forth in the present 
articles to States and international organizations, non-parties to the 
articles, in so far as such ruJes may have the legal force of customary 
international law independently of the articles." 
12 "Article 5. Non-retroactivity of the present articles 
"Without prejudice to the application of any ruJes set forth in the 
present articles to which the relations between States would be 
subject under international law independently of the articles, the 
present articles apply only to the granting or refusal of jurisdictional 
unmunities to foreign States and their property after the entry into 
force of the said articles as regards States r,arties thereto or States 
having declared themselves bound thereby. ' 
13 See footnote 8 above. 
14 Yearbook .. . 1980, vol. II (Part Two), pp. 139--140, para. 117. 
15 Yearbook ... 1981, vol. II (Part Two), p. 157, para. 225. 
16 See footnote 5 above. 
17 "Article 7. Obligation to give effect to State immunity 
"Paragraph I=Alternative A 
"I. A State shall give effect to State immunity under [as stipu-
(COIIlinwd 011 nut ptlg •. ) 
State),1S article 9 (E~ression of consent),19 and article 
10 (Counter-claims) is awaiting consideration by the 
Drafting Committee and the Commission. The revised 
versions of draft articles 7-10 were recast by the Special 
Rapporteur in the light of the rich and helpful debate at 
the various meetings of the Commission on the topic21 
and at the request of the Chairman of the Drafting 
Committee, with a view to assisting the Drafting Com-
mittee in the expedition of its consideration. 
9. It should be noted at this juncture that draft articles 
7-11, in their original versions as well as in their revised 
forms, have been the subject of extensive discussion 
and comments in the Sixth Committee,22 even in the 
still unfinished or half-finished stage of the drafting 
exercise. The comments and observations within the 
Sixth Committee, even at this early stage of the draft 
articles, are so pertinent and serviceable for the current 
task awaiting the Drafting Committee and the Commis-
sion that it would appear useful to include a brief 
reference to them in this fourth report, which may 
provide a useful bridge between part II (General 
principles) and part III (Exceptions to State immun-
Ity) of the draft articles. 
(Foo/llott 17 conlilUU!d.) 
lated in] article 6 by refraining from subjectin~ another State to the 
jurisdiction of its otherwise competent judiCIal and administrative 
authorities, (or] and by disallowing the (conduct] continuance of legal 
proceedings against another State. 
"Paragraph I-Alternative B 
"I. A State shall give effect to State immunity under article 6 by 
refraining from subjecting another State to its jurisdiction (and] or 
from allowing legal proceedinss to be conducted against another 
State, notwithstanding the eXISting competence of the authority 
before which die proceedings are pending. 
"2. For the pu!")X)5e Of parap-aph 1, a legal proceeding is 
considered (deemed] to be one agamst another State, whether or not 
named as a party, so long as the proceeding in effect seeks to compel 
that other State either to submit to local jurisdiction or else to bear 
the consequences of judicial determination by the competent author-
ity which may (involve] affect the sovereign rights, interests, prop-
erties or activities of the State. 
"3. In particular, a proceeding may be considered to be one 
against another State (when] if it is instituted against one of its 
organs, agencies or instrumentalities acting as a sovereign authority; 
or against one of its representatives in respect of acts performed by 
them as State representatives, or (if) it is designed to deprive another 
State of its public property or the use of such property in its 
possession or control." 
NOTE: Paragraph 3 would constitute an alternative to the text of 
aratt article 3, subparagraph 1(a). 
18 "Article 8. Consent of State 
"I. (Subject to part III of the draft articles] Un!ess. o~he.rwise 
provided in the present articles, a State shall not exerCIse Jun~lctlon 
10 any legal proceeding against another State (as defined 10 artIcle 7) 
without the consent of that other State. 
"2. Jurisdiction may be exercised in a legal proceeding against a 
State which consents to its exercise." 
19 "Article 9. Expression of consent 
"I. A State may give its consent to the exercise of jurisdiction by 
the court of another State under article 8, paragraph 2, either 
expressly or by necessary implication from its own conduct in relation 
to the proceeding in progress. 
"2. Such consent may be Biven in advance by an ~xpress provi-
sion in a treaty or an internatIOnal agreement or a wntten contract, 
expressly undertaking to submit to the jurisdictio~ C?r to waive State 
immunity in respect of one or more types of actiVlttes. 
"3. Such consent may also be Biven after a dispute has arisen by 
actua1 submission to the jurisdicbon of the court or by an express 
waiver of immunity, (in writing, or otherwise] for a specific case 
before the court. 
"4. A State is deemed to have given consent to the exercise of 
jurisdiction by the court of another State by voluntary submission if it 
bas instituted a legal proceeding or taken part or a step in the 
proceeding relating to the merit, without raising a plea of immunity. 
"5. A State is not deemed to have given such consent by 
voluntary submission or waiver if it appears before the court of 
another State in order specifically to assert immunity or its rights to 
property and the circumstances are such that the State would have 
been entitled to immunity, had the proceeding been brought against 
it. 
"6. Failure on tbe part of a State to enter ap~arance in a 
proceeding before the court of another State does not Imply consent 
to the exercise of jurisdiction by that court. Nor is waiver of State 
immunity to be implied from such non-appearance or any conduct 
other than an express indication of consent as provided in paragraphs 
2 and 3. 
"7. A State may claim or waive immunity at any time before or 
during any stage of the proceedings. However, a State cannot claiJ?! 
immunity from the jurisdiction of the court of another State after It 
bas taken steps in the proceedings relating to the merit, unless it can 
satisfy the court that It could not have acquired knowledge of the 
facts on which a claim of immunity can be based, in which event it can 
claim immunity based on those facts if it does so at the earliest 
possible moment." 
20 "Article 10. Counter-claims 
"I. In any legal proceedings instituted by a State, or in which a 
State has taken part or a step relating to the merit, in a court of 
another State, }~sdiction may be exercise~ in .respect of any 
counter-c1aim anslDg out of the same legal relatIonship or facts as the 
principal claim, or if, in accordance with the provisions of the pre~nt 
articles, jurisdiction could be exercised, had separate proceedings 
been instituted before that court. 
"2. A State malting a counter-claim in proceedings before a court 
of another State is deemed to have given consent to the exercise .of 
jurisdiction by that court with respect not only to the counter-clalm 
but also to the principal claim, arising out of the same legal 
relationship of facts (as the counter-claim J. " 
21 Yearbook . .. 1981, vol. I, pp. 55 et seq., 16S3rd t~ 1657th 
meetings, and pp. 110 et seq., 1663rd to 1665th meetlDgs; see 
especially the summing-up by the Special Rapporteur, l?P. 76-79, 
1657th meeting, paras. 2-24, and pp. 120-121, 1665th meettng, paras. 
1-3 and 5. 
22 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth 
Session, Sixth Comminee, 45th to 52nd meetings; and "Topical 
summary ... thirty-sixth session" (A/CN.4/L.339), paras. 156-179. 
Draft articles on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property (continued) 
PART III. EXCEPTIONS TO STATE IMMUNITY 
ARTICLE 11 (Scope of the present part) 
A. General considerations or the scope 
or the present part 
1. LINKAGE BElWEEN GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND 
EXCEPTIONS TO SlATE IMMUNITY 
10. To eroceed from part n (General principles) to 
part III (Exceptions to State immunity) without hav-
ing the final texts of all the draft articles in part II in 
hand is inevitably to presume and presuppose a number 
of propositions. While the draft articles in part II which 
were the subject of preliminary as well as substantive 
discussion by the Commission in the course of the 
thirty-third session may be pending consideration and 
final adoption by the Drafting Committee and pro-
visional approval by the Commission, it is useful to 
recall some of the instructions and guidance given by 
the Commission and approved by the General Assem-
bly for past, current and future work on the topic to be 
completed and presented by the Special Rapporteur. 
(a) Source materials 
There can be no mistake as to the source materials to 
be consulted, which include not only national legisla-
tions, conventions, judicial decisions, State practice 
and opinions of writers, but also an important volume 
of information supplied by member Governments and 
their replies to the questionnaire.23 These are the 
accepted sources of materials to be used and relied 
upon.24 
(b) Concentration on general principles 
The Special Rapporteur has been directed to concen-
trate first and foremost on the general principles25 
which he has endeavoured to incorporate in part II of 
the study on the topic, and are now included in the 
second and third reports. The areas of initial interest 
relating to the substantive contents and constitutive 
elements of the general rules of jurisdictional immuni-
ties of States are therefore treated in part II. 
(c) Extent of the application 
of State immunities 
It was also understood that the question of the extent 
of, or limitations on, the application of the rules of 
State immunity, which is the subject of current ex-
amination in part III, required an extremely careful and 
balanced approach, and that the exceptions identified 
in the prehminary report26 were merely noted as poss-
ible exceptions, without any assessment or evaluation of 
their significance in State practice. As a timely remin-
der, these possible exceptions to the general rule of 
State immunity include: 
1. Trading or commercial activity; 
2. Contracts of employment; 
3. Personal injuries and damage to yroperty; 
4. Ownership, possession and use 0 property; 
5. Patents, trade marks and other mtellectual 
property; 
6. Fiscal liabilities and customs duties; 
7. Shareholdings and membership of bodies 
corporate; 
8. Ships employed in commercial service; 
9. Arbitration. 
(d) The inductive method 
An inductive approach to the topic initially proposed 
and adofted by the Commission has received general 
approva by the General Assembly. Accordingly, the 
method and techniques employed in the preparation 
and presentation of reports and draft articles have been 
inductive in the sense that conclusions and propositions 
of law are to be drawn from the practice of States and 
23 The replies of Governments to the questionnaire which the 
Secretariat addressed to them on 2 October 1979. originally dis-
tributed as document A/CN.4/343 and Add. 1-4. are reproduced in 
volume 20 of the United NationS Legislative Series. entitled Materials 
on Jurisdictio1Ull Imnumiliu of Sillies and their Property (Sales No. 
E/F.81.V.I0). pp. 557 et seq. 
:USee the preliminary report. paras. 22-45 (Yearbook . .. 1979. 
vol. n (Part One). pp. 231 et seq .• document A/CN.4/323). 
ZSSee Yurbook ... 1979. vol. n (Part Two). p. 186. para. 178. 
-YeGI'book . .. 1979. vol. n (Part One). pp. 241-243. document 
A/CN.4/323, paras. 68-81. 
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not in isolation from the living realities of customary 
international law. The task before the Commission 
includes a process of codification of existing practice 
and progressive development of rules of international 
law designed to reconcile, if not to resolve, the various 
conflicts of interests :n the exercise of sovereign rights 
and powers by States. The Special Rapporteur has 
therefore endeavoured to proceed with the greatest 
caution, following the direction and guidance furnished 
by the Commission and the General Assembly. Devia-
tion from the guidelines indicated would promote even 
greater theoretical controversies and divergencies of 
opinions which are more academic than practical. 
2. OBSERVATIONS MADE IN TIlE SIXTII CoMMITTEE 
OF TIlE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
11. Without submitting an article-by-article analysis 
of the comments and observations made by representa-
tives of Governments in the General Assembly at its 
thirty-sixth session,27 it miJtht be useful to make suc-
cinct references to some o(the salient points covered. 
12. Most of the representatives who spoke on the 
topic considered it one of the most important subjects 
in the current programme of work of the Commission. 
They appreciated the useful synthesis of the abundant 
material concerning State practice found in the pre-
liminary and second reports to the Commission. While 
a number of representatives noted with satisfaction the 
progress so far made by the Commission towards 
elaborating a set of draft articles on the topic on the 
basis of the reports submitted, some difficulties were 
expressed in an effort to assess the Commission's work 
at this stage. Some reservation of judgment has been 
sounded while awaiting submission of the draft articles 
contained in part III, which are intended to deal with 
exceptions or limitations upon the general principles of 
State immunity. This was not unnatural, owing to the 
unfinished nature of the draft articles in part II, still to 
be finalized by the Commission after consideration by 
the Drafting Committee. 
13. Several views were expressed with respect to the 
nature and the scope of the topic, in an effort to identify 
problem areas facing the Commission which it must 
endeavour to avoid, circumvent or obviate in order to 
achieve progress in dealing with the subject. The main 
issues to be resolved in the treatment of part II 
(General principles) are many and varied. 
(a) The principle of State immunity 
as a general rule 
14. The question has been put time and again whether 
State immunity is a rule, a general rule, a general 
principle of international law , or rather an exception to 
a more fundamental norm of State sovereignty of which 
one aspect covers the exercise of various sovereign 
powers, territorial, national and jurisdictional. Differ-
ences of opinion continue to exist in this particular 
area. Reconciliation is possible, depending on how far 
back one wishes to trace the origin of State immunity. 
When dealing with principles of soverei~t¥-terri­
torial, national or personal-immunity from Junsdiction 
can be viewed without hesitation as an exception to the 
general rule of State jurisdiction. But if one starts from 
the topic of State immunity, taking into account the 
27See "Topical summary ... thirty-sixth session" (A/CN.4/ 
L.339). paras. 1~179. 
Jeneral practice of States as evidence of customary 
mtemational law, jurisdictional immunity of States 
could be viewed either as a rule, a general rule or a 
Jeneral principle which itself admits of some exceptions 
m State practice. Since the topic is entitled "Jurisdic-
tional ~mu~ties of States and their propeI"!Y", the 
proposItion IS warranted that State Immumty is a 
general rule, rather than an exception to a more 
fundamental norm of sovereignty, which it also inevit-
ably is. It depends on the point of view from which the 
question under examination is being treated. Dispute 
as to the nature of State immunity as a general rule or 
an exception to the general rule could be resolved by 
reference to its context. Treating the topic of State 
immunity as such, it cannot appear otherwise than as a 
rule and not an exception to the rule. Indeed, even in 
dealing with aspects of State sovereignty, from the 
standpoint of the State claiming jurisdictional immunity 
it is asserting its own sovereignty and not an exception 
or waiver of its sovereign power. Viewed in that 
context, the application or non-application of State 
immunity represents the resolution of a conflict of 
sovereignties between States, an effort to harmonize 
conflicts of interests in the assurance of respect for 
national sovereignty. The maxim par in parem im-
perium non habet is a valid starting point and a 
convincing legal basis for the doctrine of State immun-
ity. 
(b) The scope of the topic 
15. The question of scope has given rise to undue 
concern over the widening concept of immunities from 
jurisdiction, a situation which did not appear to be 
extraordinary since the definitional problems had not 
yet been fully discussed. Reference to draft article 2 
(Use of terms) could afiord some helpful guidance. The 
scope of the topic in this particular respect does not 
extend beyond the judicial Jurisdiction, or adjudicatory 
jurisdiction, which could include the exercise of some 
administrative power in connection with pre-trial pro-
cedures and post-judgment execution orders. The 
apprehension that the draft articles in part II (General 
pnnciples) could be regarded as recognition of wider 
Immunities than hitherto admissible in State practice 
would appear to be without any valid ground or 
justification. No one is discussing the possibility, 
however remote, of immunity of one State from the 
overall sovereign power of another State. Even the 
maxim par in parem imperium non habet has never 
been interpreted with such liberality as to give a State 
unregulated freedom to exercise its sovereignty where-
ever it pleases and regardless of international law. Out 
of the context of adjudication, jurisdictional immuni-
ties would not appear to be very meaningful. A State 
does not normally exercise its sovereign power over 
another State without being responsible for its acts of 
domination. Nor can it exercise imperium within the 
territory of another State without the latter's consent. 
Such sovereign power, as adjudication of litigation, is 
being exercised by the court within and over its own 
territory, or territorial jurisdiction, or over everything 
found on its own territory or within its territorial limits, 
rather than being an exercise of sovereignty over or 
against another State, unless it is present there by 
mutual consent. In such event, the exercise of territor-
ial judicial jurisdiction could be regulated by mutual 
agreement. This does not preclude the possibility of a 
State performing activities not in the exercise of im-
perium, but on the same footing as any other pc:rson, 
national or foreign, natural or juridical, which are 
Jenerally amenable or subject to the local or territorial 
JurisdiCtIon. The fact that the activities are attributable 
to a foreign sovereign State does not necessarily imply 
the application of State immunity, especially where 
such activities bear no relation to the exercise of any 
sovereign power by that State. 
(c) The relevance of lack of consent 
as a matter of principle 
16. Doubts were expressed regarding the relevance of 
consent as a matter of principle. Fear was voiced lest 
State immunity could be regarded as more absolute and 
unqualified than it has hitlierto been admitted even in 
the most generous State practice. A more thorough 
examination of the draft articles in rart II will reveal 
the true identity of the relevance 0 lack of consent, 
which was presented not so much in the positive aspect 
of consent as in that of a requirement of jurisdiction, 
nor was consent as such put forward as the only 
admissible exception to State immunity, nor indeed was 
consent to be viewed as a sound basiS upon which to 
found and exercise jurisdiction, territorial, national or 
otherwise. The draft articles, in particular articles 8-10, 
tend to support general prinCiples which are stated 
diametrically differently from the proposition which 
could prompt such apprehension. While consent of 
State is not necessarily the foundation of jurisdiction, 
let alone an exception to the exercise of existing 
territorial jurisdiction, its absence has been put forward 
as an essential element of State immumty. This is 
practically the converse of the assertion that consent of 
the defendant State permits the exercise ofJ·urisdiction, 
although it would as a consequence exclu e or negate 
the application of State immunity. The reverse was 
actually suggested. Lack of consent is an ingredient or 
constitutive element of State immunity. It follows from 
this proposition that, conversely, the existence or ex-
pression or I?roof of consent precludes the claim of 
State immuDlty without itself constituting a basis for 
jurisdiction. 
17. There could be varying degrees of consent, as 
there are several ways of expressing it: by words or by 
conduct, in advance or in facie curiae, generally or ad 
hoc. Consent is a neutral term, colourless but suffi-
ciently positive to exclude immunity in case of its 
presence, although not necessarily adequate to found 
Jurisdiction in every case. A more colouIfuI and active 
expression of consent could take the form of actual 
imtiation of a legal proceeding by a State. Bringing a 
counter-claim is a less aggressive form of expressing con-
sent. Without taking the initiative of itself instituting a 
proceeding first, a State could nevertheless initiate a 
counter-claim in answer to the principal claim in-
stituted against it. Such positive action by the State is 
tantamount to its submission to the jurisdiction of the 
forum of another State, although the extent of its 
volition is obviously far less than voluntary submission 
by the State instituting the initial proceedmgs. 
18. While lip-service abounds in the writings of £ubli-
cists and in judicial decisions with respect to sigmficant 
consensual theories or the various theories of consent, 
such aspects have not been considered in fart II since 
they belong more appropriately to part II . However, 
the inductive approach has pre-empted premature 
treatment of any doctrine before an analytical examina-
tion of State practice has been made. As will be seen, 
the theories of consent, express and implied, have been 
advanced in explanation of, or as Justification for, 
several instances of rejection or denial of State immun-
ity, and as additional doctrinal or theoretical basis for 
an exception to State immunity in certain areas of State 
activities. 
19. Consent of the State as such has never been 
regarded as a prerequisite for the exercise of jurisdic-
tion by the court of another State, let alone a founda-
tion of its jurisdiction. Rather it is its absence, or lack 
of consent, which is a prerequisite of State immunity. 
The .eresence, admission or expression in any form or 
mamfestation of consent which is recognizable will 
operate to eliminate, exclude or remove the possibility 
of jurisdictional immunity. For this reason the question 
of the establishment of consent of State, whicti can be 
expressed by different methods and in different forms, 
such as voluntary submission, waiver, agreement and 
counter-claims, clearly forms part of the general princi-
ples of State immunities, and these methods are not 
truly exceptions to the general rule of State immunity, 
although by analogy they may have been so considered 
in the judicial practice of some States or in some 
national legislations or even international conventions 
or agreements, for consent could lead to the same 
result as exceptions, that is to say, the exercise of 
jurisdiction or denial of immunity. Nevertheless, in the 
ultimate analysis, in the present study lack of consent 
and not consent of State as such is treated as part and 
parcel of the general principles of State immunities. 
The question of consent of State in connection with the 
creation, constitution or scope of jurisdiction has not 
been studied in part II in the second and third reports, 
notwithstanding the expression of some reservation or 
even hesitating reactions to some aspects of consensual 
doctrine which could lend itself to strengthening "abso-
lutism", long forsaken and exploded in the annals of 
international practice of States. 
(d) The interrelations between competence 
and State immunity 
20. Differences of view were also expressed regarding 
the relativity or relevance of competence in the sense of 
judicial or adjudicatory jurisdictIOn. In strict logic, the 
question of jurisdictional immunity of States does not 
and should not arise in cases where there is no jurisdic-
tion in the circumstances to begin with. This proposi-
tion did not draw any objections from representatives 
of civil-law systems, where the court may declare itself 
incompetent in the face of a plea of jurisdictional 
immunity, declining jurisdiction either on the ground 
that the defendant is entitled to immunity or that the 
court is otherwise incompetent, that is, lacking the 
necessary jurisdiction or competence. The distinction 
between incompetence d' attribution and immunite de 
juridiction, for mstance, is not always drawn, and when 
it is, is often too fine to admit of adequate expression or 
precision, whereas logic tends to support the {)roposi-
tion that, in all cases where the courts have no Jurisdic-
tion, there is no need to question the possibility or 
legitimacy of a claim of State immunity. In actual 
practice, however, the pragmatic approach of the com-
mon-law tradition coul(l not accord any priority to the 
establishment of competence or jurisdiction before pro-
ceeding to determine the applicability of the rule of 
State immunity. There is no established order of prior-
ity among the various grounds on which the litigant 
could challenge the exercise of jurisdiction by the 
court. 
21. Without in any way attemptin, to establish or 
even suggest any order of prionty, It is nevertheless 
submitted that the rules of competence of the court are 
very relevant in all cases, whether or not the question 
of State immunity is also involved. A fortiori, where 
there is a claim of State immunity, jurisdiction is hiJdtly 
relevant. Owing to the pre-eminent importance of the 
rule of State immunity, involving considerations not 
only of internal laws and national jurisprudence, but 
often also principles of international law and comity of 
nations or even diplomacy, the court is not particularly 
reluctant to exanune a plea of State immunity in any 
given case, even if it were to reach the ultimate 
conclusion of jurisdiction negatively or positively. The 
court could uphold its jurisdiction in such a case by 
denying immunity. On the other hand, it could also 
decline jurisdiction on the ground of State immunity or 
on other grounds of lack of competence, or on the 
doctrine of "act of State", which involves an examina-
tion of the merits of the case.28 Thus, a choice remains 
open in draft article 7 as to whether or not to add, in 
paragraph 1, alternative B, the phrase "notwithstand-
mg the existing competence of the authority before 
which the proceedings are pending". The usefulness of 
such a phrase is indeed relative, according to whether 
or not it is included as a reminder of the relatively 
logical necessity of competence or the existence of 
jurisdiction so essentially relevant to jurisdictional im-
munity. Without the necessary jurisdiction, immunity 
would seem to hang in the air and could be upheld or 
confirmed only in principle or h¥,Po,thetically, as there 
would in such a case be no jurisdiction from which the 
foreign State would or would not be immune. 
(e) The relative flexibility 
of State immunity 
22. Because of the relativity of consent, or rather 
expression thereof, which could at any time operate to 
frustrate a claim of State immunity, the rule or princi-
ples of State immunity must maintain a liberal measure 
of flexibility. It was noted that State immunity was 
never claimed to be a rule of jus cogens, and this is not 
unsupported in practice. There is no breach of interna-
tional obligation for a State to over-extend the courtesy 
of non-exercise of jurisdiction or to accord State im-
munity beyond the extent recognized or required by 
international law . Indeed, several international instru-
ments even provide for such latitude . or flexibility, 
leaving the choice open to States in certain specified 
areas of the activities involved to withhold qr uphold a 
claim of immunity. In point of fact, in the course of 
progressive evolution of State practice there has been 
no strong protest or international complaint or litiga-
tion by a State adjudged a debtor after its claim of 
immunity was denied, duly or otherwise. 
"'See, for instance, the case UbYIIn-AmeriaUI OU ConIpGny V. 
SociIIIirt People's UbYIUI Arab Jtmllllairi.111 (1980). U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia CirCUIt (11tle17Ulliofllll Leglll 
ltltilerials (Washington, D.C.), vol. XX. No.1 (January 1981). p. 
161). 
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23. It is also true that a State is buffered or cushioned 
by two pbases of jurisdictional immunity, each being 
independent of the other, namely immunity from pre-
trial jurisdiction, which extends to the trial up to final 
decision, and immunity from post-judgment measures 
of execution, in satisfaction of the judgment. A sep-
arate waiver is required in each case, so as to delay the 
effect of possible enforcement measures aftecting a 
foreign State or its property. Both of these could 
conveniently be maintained so as to allow furtber 
moments of reflection and a breathing space for nego-
tiations to achieve a meaningful settlement of a dispute 
involving a foreign State by pacific means that could be 
extrajudicial, or even extralegal. Far from being a rule 
of jus cogens, tbere is thus ample room for Bexibility in 
the field of jurisdictional immunity of States. 
(f) The dual approach 
24. In an endeavour to verify the division or separa-
tion of areas of activities conducted by States which are 
immune from the jurisdiction and others wbich are 
amenable or subject to the jurisdiction of the compe-
tent authorities, a novel sU$8estion was made by a 
re(,resentative. Without haVIng to predetermine the 
eXIstence of a ~eneral rule of State immunities, it would 
not be imposSible to proceed to examine State practice 
which could provide definite evidence of the two types 
of circumstances: cases where State immunity operates 
and cases of non-immunity. In other words, a search 
could be made at the same time to identify activities 
which are QCtIl jure imperii, where State immunity 
applies, and activities which are acta jure gestionis, 
where State immunity is not applicable. 
25. At first glance, this two-pronged or dual approach 
appears promising and deserves consideratton in 
greater depth. The suggestion seems worthy of experi-
ment, if not ultimate pursuit. It is respectfully submitted, 
bowever, without wishing to abandon any worthwhile 
suggestion, that the dual approach need not necessarily 
result in time-saving, although efforts would bave to be 
redoubled. It could be likened to an endeavour "to 
bum the candle at both ends", indeed without being 
certain that it is the same candle ane;! that "both ends" 
would eventually meet. Nor is it assured that there 
would be no overlal?ping or gap, or twilight zone or 
borderland wbere eXIsting uncertainties would not only 
linger but would continue to be preserved and even to 
grow. 
26. The dual approach would not appear to be consis-
tent either with State practice or international agree-
ments and conventions, which tend to recognize a 
general rule of State immunity, as adopted in draft 
article 6, while admitting the possibility of qualifica-
tions as to yrinciples, and limitations as to exceptions to 
the genera principles. Without ensuring greater speed 
or expedition in the ('rogress of the CommiSSIon's 
work, since the expressIon acta jure imperii is not free 
from ambiguities, ambivalence and equivocation, sucb 
a two-pronged undertaking would in fact increase the 
burden of the task by more than doubling it. To 
increase the workload without essentially saving time 
would not appear to be a fruitful pursuit. Besides, the 
existing structure, half-way completed, would bave to 
be completely dismantled and structured anew to pre-
pare for results that do not seem to be any more certain 
or concrete than the path now mapped out and well 
sign-posted, which is relatively assured to lead to 
tangible and positive results, whatever they may be. 
(g) The reumons between the rules 
tmd the general exceptions 
'1:7. The transition from part II (General principles) 
to part III {Exceptions to State immunity} could be 
made more harmonious by a provision establishing or 
cl~ng the connecting link between the general 
prinetples set out in part II and the general exceptions 
contained in part In. This could further obviate the 
difficulties mentioned by one representative with re-
gard to the formulation of draft article 6, which was 
stated in normative form on account of the phrase "in 
accordance with the provisions of the present articles". 
In his opinion, a rule of State immunity could be stated 
in more definite form, as in article 15 of the European 
Convention on State Immunity. 291bis formulation bad 
the advantage of clarity, in the sense that the Conven-
tion stated all possible exceptions before the statement 
of & general rule. It should be observed, however, that 
the reverse could achieve the same result, as appears to 
be the case in article 1, "Immunity from jurisdiction", 
of the United Kingdom State Immunity Act 197830 and 
also in section 1604, "Immunity of a foreign State from 
jurisdiction", of the United States Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976.31 The link between the general 
rule and the exceptions appears to have been missing 
only because the exceptions have not yet been fully 
stated, as consideration of part III is only starting. It 
was thus understandable that some reluctance was 
voiced before seeing or identifying and verifying the 
&CteJ?tability of the possible exce('tions listed, which 
requrre careful and delicate conSideration. The for-
mulation of article 6 as adopted by the Commission, "in 
accordance with the proviSIons of the present articles" , 
was intended to establish beyond dou!)t that the applic-
able law would be the law of the convention being 
elaborated and not the customary law. Indeed, if the 
draft articles envisaged are formulated to reBect accur-
ately State practice on the subject, tben the p'hrase in 
question would not have the effect of disqualifying tbe 
29 "Article 15 
"A Contracting State shall be entitled to immunity from the 
jurisdiction of the courts of another Contracting State if the proceed-
mgs do not fan within Articles 1 to 14; the court shan decline to 
entertain such proceedings even if the State does not appear." 
Council of Europe, European Convention on SUllt Immunity tuid 
Additional Protocol, European Treaty Series, No. 74 (Strasbourg, 
1972). 
:!OThe British Act of 1978 provides: 
"PART I 
"PltOCEEDlNGS IN UNITED KINGDOM BY 
OR AGAINST OlHER STATES 
"Immunity from jurisdiction 
"1. (1) A State is immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of 
the United Kingdom except· as provided in the follOwing provisions 
of this Part of this Act. 
(United Kingdom, The Public GennaJ Acts, 1978, part 1, chap. 33, p. 
715.) 
31The United States Act of 1976 provides: 
"SeClion 1604: Immunity of II foreign StIlte 
from jUrUdiction 
"Subject to existing international agreements to which the United 
States is a party at die time of enactment of this Act a foreign state 
sball be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United 
States and of the States except· as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of 
this chapter. " (United Sillies Code, 1976 EdiIion, vol. 8, title 28, chap. 
97, p. 207). 
norm stated in draft article 6 from being a basic rule of 
international law. All these preoccupations would dis-
appear once the entire draft articles, including the 
provisions of part III, are completed. 
28. In the meantime, these lingering doubts and 
hesitations could be eliminated by inserting a tran-
sitional provision to bridge the relationship between 
the general principles stated in part II and the general 
exceptions to be dISCUSSed in part III. In response to the 
concerns expressed and for the sake of greater clarity, 
an introductory provision might be in order to preface 
the ensuing provisions of part III. . 
B. Text or draft article 11 
29. Draft article 11 reads as follows: 
Article 11. Scope 0/ the present part 
Except as provided in the foUowing articles of the 
present part, .eel sbaII be given to the general princi-
ples or State immunity as contained in part II of the 
present articles. 
ARTICLE 12 (Tndiag or commercial dvity) 
A. General considerations of the exceptions 
1. LIMITATIVE NATURE OF THE EXCEmoNS 
30. As has been recalled, the general rule of State 
immunity is formulated in draft article 6 in relative 
terms, since its application is qualified by the phrase "in 
accordance with the provisions of the draft articles" 
and is clearly limited by the exceptions contained in 
part III. Other general principles as stated in part II are 
equally subject in their application to the exceptions 
listed m part III. Thus, the obligation to give effect to 
State immunity in draft article 7, as a corollary to the 
general rule of State immunity, is also subject to each 
and every exception provided m part III. Similarly, lack 
of consent as an element of State immunity as men-
tioned in draft article 8, as well as the various methods 
of expressing consent illustrated in draft articles 9-10 
whicti, if established, would operate to disqualify or 
nUllify any claim of State immunity, would have no 
application in regard to any of the circumstances which 
constitute an exception to the general rule or principles 
of State immunities. Thus, according to the present 
formulation of rules and exceptions, the establishment 
of consent, which is inconsistent with State immunity, is 
not viewed as an exception to immunity; rather, in 
cases where there is clearly no consent or there is an 
apparent lack of consent which is a constitutive element 
of State immunity (draft article 8), the rule of State 
immunity still has no application if the circumstances 
fall within one of the exceptions to be examined in part 
III. 
31. The exceptions appear to be limitative in nature; 
that is to say, they serve to restrict or limit the 
operation or application of a seneral rule of State 
immunity, whether it is the active rule for the State 
claiming immunity or its corollary, the obligation to 
give eff¢ to immunity, or to lDlplement the first 
general rule, or indeed the requirement of absence of 
consent or unwillingness to submit to jurisdiction. In 
the last instance, in spite of lack of consent and against 
the will of the foreign sovereign State, the exceptions to 
State immunities, when established, serve to clear the 
path for the court to exercise its normal jurisdiction 
even in regard to an unwilling foreign sovereign State. 
In the circumstances falling within any of the accepted 
exceptions, the rule of State immunity as an obstacle to 
the exercise of jurisdiction is overcome or obviated or 
removed, regardless of the state of mind of the defen-
dant and irrespective of its unwillingness or absence of 
consent to the institution or continuation of the pro-
ceedings. 
2. LEGAL BASIS FOR LIMITING STATE IMMUNITY 
32. It is only in a manner of speaking that State 
immunity may be said to be restricted or limited, in the 
sense that it is not "absolute" or accorded in every type 
of circumstances, regardless of the capacity in which 
the State has acted or irrespective of the category of 
activities attributable to the State. The juridical basis 
for "non-immunity" may be described as the counter-
part of the legal basis for "State immunity". If the 
exercise of imperium by a State was the basis for 
immunity, then the absence of connection with im-
perium, or the non-exercise of sovereign power by the 
State, would afford the raison d'etre for cases of 
"non-immunity". If it can be said that a State is 
immune on account of, or because of, or in respect of 
its acts or activities in the exercise of its sovereign 
power, or in the performance of its sovereign functions, 
then likewise tliat immunity ceases where no such 
sovereign act or activity or power or function of a State 
is involved or affected by the exercise or resumption or 
continuation of judicial authority by the court of 
another State. The criteria which may serve to circum-
scribe or limit the field of operation or to narrow or 
delineate the scope of application of the doctrine or 
rule of State immunity are many. It is the purpose of 
the present part of the articles to examine each of these 
criteria which tend to restrict the application of immun-
ity in State practice. 
33. Whatever the legal basis or justification for State 
immunity or for the corresponding obligation to recog-
nize and to give effect to State immunity as earlier 
discussed in part II, it seems clear that the scope and 
extent of its application is limited thereby. Immunity 
operates as long as there is a legal basis for it. In the 
absence of such basis, there is no immunity. Thus, the 
reverse of legal justification for "immunity" is the legal 
basis for "non-immunity". For each and every type of 
limitation on State immunity or for each exception to 
the general rule of immunity, there a{>pears to be an 
op~site case or a converse set of crrcumstances in 
whlch State immunity is not recognized and immunity 
need not be accorded. The justification for denial of 
State immunity in each of the cases of exceptions to 
State immunities is to be found accordin~ly in the 
nature of the activities of the State in question or the 
field of activities undertaken by or attributable to that 
State, in relation to which or in connection with which a 
dispute or cause of action has arisen. 
34. These "opposites" or "converse cases" are often 
not as clear-cut as would be desirable. Yet in State 
practice they have been employed to distinguish be-
tween cases of "immunity" and those of "non-immun-
ity". One way of justifying non-recognition of State 
immunity in a given case is the absence or non-
existence of reasons or valid grounds for allowing State 
immunity in such a case. State immunity has therefore 
been denied on several grounds, including, inter alia, 
the fact that the case concerned exclusively private-law 
activities or private acts which bear no relation to the 
public image or public and official functions of a State, 
or acts which can be performed and activities which are 
normally conducted by individuals or by States and 
individuals alike in the same or indistinguishable capac-
ity or manner. The legal basis for "non-immunity" IS to 
be found therefore in one or several of the distinctions 
which appear to have been worked out and coun-
tenanced in the judicial and governmental practice of 
States. 
3. THE V AlUOUS DISTINCTIONS 
35. If the absence of State immunity can be based on 
several grounds which relate to the nature and types of 
activities attributable to a State, it is useful to examine 
even briefly some of the distinctions drawn between 
acts or activities to which State immunity is applicable 
and those not covered by immunity. 
(a) Dual personality of the State 
36. A State is sometimes said to be endowed with a 
double or dual personality. A State may assume the 
role of an ente politico, 32 or political entity, just as it can 
also do all other things like any other corporate entity 
vested with legal or juridical personality, corpo morale, 
"it being incumbent upon (the State1 to provide for the 
administration of the pubhc body and for the material 
interests of the individual citizens, it must acquire and 
own t>roperty, it must contract, it must sue and be sued, 
and 10 a word, it must exercise civil rights in like 
manner as any other juristic person or private indi-
vidual" ("un altro corpo morale 0 privato individuo 
qualunque").33 
(b) Dual capacity of the State 
37. In a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals of 
Florence, a distinction has been recognized in the 
practice of States between the State as political (>Ower, 
potere eolitico, and as persona civile, or Juristic 
person. Denying immunity in an action for services 
rendered, while recognizing the principle of immunity 
based on the independence of States, the Corte di 
Cassazione of Florence said: 
. . . ; however, when these high prerogatives are not involved, 
when the Government, as a civil body, descends into the sphere of 
contracts and transactions so as to acquire rights and to assume 
obligations like any private person, then its independence is not 
pertinent. The State, when dealing solely with private transactions 
and obligations, must follow the rules of the common law. 35 
• 32 See, for instance, a decision by the Corte di Cassazione of Turin 
ID Morellet v. Governo Danese (1882) (Giurisprudenza /taliana 
(Turin). vol. XXXV, part 1 (1883). pp. 125 and 13(H31). 
33Ibid., pp. 130-131, cited and trans. in the Harvard Law School 
draf~ convention on competence of courts in regard to foreign States. 
herelDafter called "the Harvard draft" (Harvard Law School, Re-
search in International Law, part III, "Competence of Courts in 
regard to Foreign States" (Cambridge, Mass .• 1932). published as 
SupplefMnt to The American Journal of International Law (Washing-
ton. D.C.), vol. 26 (1932), pp. 481-482). See also Hamspohn v. Bey 
di Tunisi (1887) (II Foro Italiano (Rome), vol. XII (1887), part 1, pp. 
485-486), cited and trans. in the Harvard draft, op. cit., pp. 480-481. 
"Gunieres v. Elmilik (1886) (II Foro Italiano (Rome), vol. XI. 
part 1 (1886), pp. 913 and 919-921), a decision confirming that of the 
Court of Appeal of Lucca (1886) (ibid., p. 490). 
lSPassage cited in utenso by the Court of Appeal of Lucca in 
HamspohiJ v. Bey di Tunisi (1887) (see footnote 33 above). 
~.truth,once the distinction between the Government as a body 
polittc [Govemo erau politico) and the Government as a civil entity 
[Govemo eme civile) is admitted, once it is recognized that even a 
State may by reason of acts of purely administrative nature, without 
offence to its political sovereignty, be made subject to the jurisdiction 
of foreign courts, there can be nothing more correct than that the 
foreign State against whom in this capacity a proceeding is instituted, 
must be included in the category of foreigners contemplated. . ., the 
States being, in this respect, ass.imilated to other persons, physical or 
juristic, Dot forming part of the Italian Kingdom.36 
(c) Acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis 
38. Allusion has earlier been made to the distinction 
that has become a catchword in State practice between 
acta jure imperii, on the one hand, for which States are 
immune, and acta jure gestionis, jure privatorum, on the 
other, for which no immunity is accorded. Thus, in a 
case involving a contract concluded by the consul as a 
State agent for the maintenance of a Greek subject 
sheltered in the asylum of Aversa, the Corte di Cassa-
zione of Naples held that: 
... the State does become subject to courts insofar as it operates 
within the sphere of civil transactions, and it has never been objected 
that the sovereignty of the State has been injured thereby; whereas 
the rationality of the law' would suffer from the opposite theory 
whereby it [i.e. the State) would claim the power to pursue its rights 
as plaintiff. while remaining beyond the reach of such action on the 
part of others.J7 
This distinction between atti d'impero and atti di ges-
tione has also been recognized in the practice of other 
States.38 Expressions such as "acts de gestion privee" or 
activities "jure et more privatorum" and "actes de 
puissance publique" or "actes de pouvoir" have also 
36Ibid., pp. 920 and 922; cited and trans. in the Harvard draft, op. 
cit., pp. 622-623. Cf. the decision of the Tribunal civil of Brussels in 
Societe pour 1a fabricalion de car/ouches v. Colonel Mutkuroff, 
Ministre de 1a gue"e de 1a principautt de Bulgarie (1888) (Pandectes 
periodiques, 1889 (Liege), p. 350. case No. 309), in which the court 
assumed jurisdiction against Bulgaria in respect of a contract for the 
purchase of bullets. It was held that, in making contracts with the 
Belgian company, Bulgaria acted as a private person, and as such 
submitted itself to all the civil consequences of the contracts. 
3?Typaldos. Console di Grecia v. Manicomio di Aversa (1886) 
(Giurisprudenza Italiana (Turin), vol. I (1886), p. 229); cited and 
trans. in the Harvard draft, op cit., pp. 624-625 . 
38 See , for example, for Belgium, Feldman v. Etat de Bahia (1907) 
(Pasicrisie beige, 1908 (Brussels), part 2, p. 55), cited in the Harvard 
draft, op. cit., p. 484; and Monnoyer et Bernard v. Etat franfais 
(1927) (Pasicrisie beige, 1927 (Brussels). part 3, pp. 12~132); cited in 
the Harvard draft, op. cit .• p. 615; in that case the Charleroi Tribunal 
civil observed that: 
". . . in operating these services [the Office of Reconstruction at 
Valenciennes), the [French) State does not bring public authority 
('Ia puissance pubhque') into play, but is doing something that 
can be done by indiViduals, and therefore acts as a civil or private 
person ... having dealt with its contracting partner as an equal 
. .. .. 
"In giving judgment in the present case, although it involves 
the French State, the court in no way impairs the sovereignty of 
that country; it is simply giving judgment, as it would with 
respect to a French citizen. since in fact the action has been 
brought against the State as a result of acts performed by it. not 
jure imperiae, but jure gestionis, as so aptly expressed by Mr. 
Gianzana. an Italian author quoted bX Rolin in his work Traitt 
du droit international (vol. I. p. 219). ' 
Cf. the Egyptian cases cited by S. Sucharitkul in "Immunities of 
foreign States before national authorities", Recueil des cours de 
I'Academie de droit international de La Haye, 1976-1, vol. 149 
(Leyden, Sijthoff, 1977), p. 138. 
--------------.--- ... 
been used.39 Others such as "actes de gouvernement", 
"actes d'autorite" and "actes de souverainete" are not 
unfamiliar to those conversant with the French system 
of administrative law. 40 
39. In actual practice, the line of distinction to be 
drawn between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis 
does not appear to be readily visible in every case. 
Borderline cases are not infrequent, particularly since 
the traditional concept of State functions or gov-
ernmental functions has fundamentally changed in con-
sequence of the continuous extensions of functions 
performed or assumed by States.41 It is in this border-
land that controversy flourishes. 
(d) Public and private nature of State 
acts or activities 
40. Another type of distinction well known in the 
practice of States relates to the nature or character of 
the acts or activities performed by the States or their 
agencies, or otherwise attributable to the governmental 
authorities. Several similar terminologies have been 
used, such as ",PUblic" and "private" activities, "public-
law authority' and "private-law transactions". Activ-
ities can be "governmental" or "non-governmental". 
Thus, in a jurisdiction, immunity was denied to a 
foreign sovereign on the ground that "even the national 
sovereign is subject to ordinary law for his obli~ations 
of a proprietary nature" and that the proceedmg did 
not relate to acts done by the reigning sovereign "as 
head of his own State", for the engagements in ques-
tion had their origin in "contracts and acts of a pnvate 
nature".42 Similarly, in another case involving a con-
tract concluded by an accredited ambassador as agent 
of a foreign government for the purchase of property to 
be used as embassy buildings, the court assumed juris-
diction in respect of an act performed by the ambassa-
dor during hiS term of office as State agent. Although 
the contract touched an instrumentum legati, it was held 
to be "a private-law transaction for the acquisition of 
private rights". 43 
39 See , for instance, a case concerning the S.S. "Sumatra": Capi· 
taW Hall, commandant Ie "Sumatra" v. Capitaine Ben$oa, comman-
dant Ie "Mercedes" (1920) (Journal du droit international (Clunet) 
(Paris), vol. 48, p. 270), a vessel belonging to the British Crown but 
operated by a private mdividual for commercial voyages, where the 
Mixed Court of Appeal of Alexandria used the expressions "dans la 
gestion de ses interetsjrivb" and "compietement en dehors de son 
action polilique"; cite in the Harvard draft, op. cit.,y. 616. In the 
case Zaki bey Gabra v. R.E. Moore Esq. et aurre (1927) (Gazene des 
triblUUJUX mixtes d'Egypte (Alexandria), vol. 17, No. 198 (April 
1927), p. 104), the court opposed an "acte de puissance publique" to a 
"contrat du droit prive"; cited in the Harvard draft, op. cit., p. 616. 
40The terms "acte d'aUlorite" and "acte de gouvemement" are 
known to French jurists as being the criterion for the division of 
competence between administrative and civil tribunals and for desig-
nating government acts which are not subject to review by any court. 
See C. J. Hamson, "Immunity of foreign States: The practice of the 
French courts", The British Year Book of Internatioilal Law, 1950 
(London), vol. 27, p. 293. . 
41 See, for example, a Netherlands decision in F. Advokaat v. I. 
Schuddinck & den Belgischen Staat (1923) (Weekblad van het Recht 
(The Hague, 1923). No. 11088); Annual Digest of Public Interna-
tional Law Cases, 1923-1924 (London), vol. 2 (l9~3), case No. 69, 
pp. 13>-134), accepting the distinction between acts jure gestionis 
and acts jure impeni, but which still held a public tug service to be a 
governmental function. 
42Carlo d'Austria v. Nobili (1921) (Giurisprudenza Ita/Ulna 
(Turin), vol. I (1921), p. 472; summary and trans. in Annual Digest 
. . . , 1919-1922, vol. I (1932), case No. 90, p. 136). . 
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41. This type of distinction as to the nature of the acts 
attributable to the State is not necessarily dissimilar 
from the distinction between acta jure imperii and acta 
jure gestionis, and may be considered as a different 
e~ression of the same kind of distinction with empha-
sis on the nature of the activities, public or private, 
governmental or non-governmental, while the charac-
teristics of jure imperii may relate more generally to the 
sovereign authonty or the governmental character of 
the State function or public capacity in which the State 
has acted. Accordingly, the distinction between acta 
jure imperii (public acts) and acta jure gestionis (private 
acts) could be said to be more comprehensive, or a 
collective division of State acts, whereas other varia-
tions found in State practice could be viewed as a 
"nuance" or a shade of difference in emphasis.44 
42. Such distinctions have also been made regarding 
the "public" and "non-public" purposes of an act or 
property attributable to the State, publicis usibus des-
tinata. In the actual application of such a distinction, 
which relates more to the ultimate objective or purpose 
and thereby depends on a SUbjective test rather than an 
objective criterion, difficulties and confusion have 
occurred.45 The distinctions between the "governmen-
tal" and "non-governmental" nature of the acts or 
services or purposes have been drawn, although they in 
fact constitute but further variations of this same type 
of division of State acts.46 
(e) Commercial and non-commercial activities 
43. Another type of distinction has been drawn be-
tween acts or activities of a State of a "commercial 
nature" or "non-¥overnmental nature" and those of 
"non-commercial' and/or "governmental" nature, or 
for commercial and non-commercial purposes. This 
distinction has opposed trading activities to non-trading 
43 See, for example, Peruccheni v. Puig y Casaurano (1928) (Rivista 
di dirino internazionale (Rome), XXth year, series III, vol. VII 
~
928), p. 521; Annual Digest ... , 1927-1928 (London), vol. 4 
1931), case No. 247, p. 365). Compare recent junsprudence in the 
ederal Republic of Germany where, in the case X v. Empire of . .. 
~
ranl (1963) (Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungs·gericht 
Tubmgen), vol. 16 (1964), p. 27; English trans. in United Nations, 
ateriDIs on lurisdictionallmmunities . .. , (op. cit.), pp. 282 et seq.), 
a repair contract for an embassy heating system was held by the 
Federal Constitutional Court to lie outside the sphere of public 
authority and was to be regarded as a "non-sovereign act". See also 
the reply of the Federal Republic of Germany (ibid., pp. 571-572) to 
question 6 of the questionnaire sent to Governments in 1979 (see 
footnote 23 above). See also C. C. A. Voskuil, "Decisions of 
Netherlands courts involving State immunity", Nether/ands Inter· 
national Law Review (Leyden), vol. XX (1973), p. 302. 
44See, for example, the reply of the United Kingdom to question 6 
of the questionnaire addressed to Governments in 1979 (United 
Nations, MaterUils on Jurisdictional Immunities . . " p. 624); the 
United Kingdom State Immunity Act 1978 distinguishes between acts 
which are performed in the exercise of sovereitln authority and other 
acts not so performed. Cf. the reply of the Uruted States of America 
to the same question, indicating that immunity does not extend to 
private acts (ibid., pp. (i~31). 
45This distinction was used in the practice of some common-law 
countries, especially the United Kingdom, and has proved less 
workable since in the ultimate analysis State property and all 
activities of States are "destined to I?ublic uses". Intentions, motives 
and purposes are often not distinguIshable. 
46The e~ression "used ... on Governmental and non-commer· 
cial service' has been employed in some conventions, for example in 
article 3, para. I, of the International Convention for the Unification 
of Certain Rules relating to the Immunity of State-owned Vessels 
(Brussels, 10 April 1926) with Additional Protocol (Brussels, 24 May 
1934) (League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol. CLXXVI, p. 199) . 
.~~--"'--""""'--. . .- . __ . _____ ~ __ ..;.::... •• ifIi·f£~""!!P~·iiI:e ___ ••• 
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activities of the State, and contrasted "commercial 
transactions" to the acts in the exercise of the gov-
ernmental or sovereign authority of the State. Thus, in 
a case before the civil Court of Rome, a judgment was 
given in favour of an Italian merchant for goods sold 
and delivered to an aviation base in Gallipoli for the 
French Government.47 This distinction has been further 
reinforced by a theory of implied consent to submit to 
the exercise of jurisdiction by the sovereignty controll-
ing the territory into which a foreign State has trans-
planted itself.48 A contract for the delivery of silk 
cocoons by a commercial agency of a foreign Govern-
ment was held to "retain the character of trading 
operation" involving all its consequences, not exclud-
ing that of an implied renunciation. 49 
44. This distinction between "commercial" and "non-
commercial" acts or activities of a State is sometimes 
associated with another more general type of distinc-
tion between "government or governmental and non-
commercial" activities, on the one hand, and "commer-
cial and non-governmental" activities on the other. The 
use of this double criterion indicates a sense of uncer-
tainty and urgency in the search for some such distinc-
tions to serve as a basis for limiting or restricting State 
immunities in a given set of circumstances. The opposi-
tion between "trading" and "non-trading" operations 
tends to cater for a similar solution in support of a 
restrictive trend which appears to have recently pre-
vailed. Several expressions have also been used and 
adopted in the case laws of many jurisdictions as well as 
in national le~islations-"commercial transaction", 
"trading operatIon", "trading activities", "acte de com-
merce" in the sense of "operation commerciale", or an 
"acte" having a "but commercial et d'interet prive", or a 
"recherche de benefices" inspired by an "idee de lucre et 
de speculation" as distingUished from an "acte politi-
que" having a "but d'interet international et politique". 50 
47 Storelli v. Govemo della Repubblica Francese (1924) (Rivista di 
diritto internazionale (Rome), XVIIth year, series III, vol. IV (1925), 
p. 236; and Annual Digest . .. 1923-1924 (London), vol. 2 (1933), 
case No. 66, p. 129). 
48Rivista . .. , p. 239. 
¥JTesini case: Rappresentanza commerciale dell'Unione Repub-
bliche Soviet v. Ditta Tesini e Malvezzi ed altr; (1924) (11 Foro Italiano 
(Rome), vol. L (1925), pp. 830, 835; and Annual Digest ... 
1925-1926 (London), vol. 3 (1929), case No. 127, p. 176). See also 
Rapprf!sentanza commerciale dell'URSS v. Societil di Navigazione 
Generale "Gerolimich" (1936) (II Foro Italiano, vol. LXIII (1938), p. 
1216; and Annual Digest . .. 1938-1940 (London), vol. 9 (1942), case 
No. 84, p. 247). 
50 See , for example, the case of the "Hungerford", where the 
decision of the Tribunal de Commerce of Nantes, in Societe maritime 
auxiliaire de transports v. Capitaine du vapeur anglais "Hungerford" 
(1918) (Revue de droit international prive (Darras) (Paris), vol. XV 
(1919), p. 510), was reversed by the Court of Appeal of Rennes in 
Capitaine Seabrook v. Societe maritime auxiliaire de transports (1919) 
(ibid., vol. XVIII (1922-1923), p. 743), which found that the 
HunQerford was employed "dans un but d'interet politique, pour les 
besoms de la defense nationale, en dehors de toute idee de lucre et de 
speculation ... " (ibid., p. 744); summary in Annual Digest . .. 
1919-1922 (op. cit.), case No. 83, pp. 122-124. Cf. Lakhowsky v. 
Office suisse des transports exterieurs (1921) (ibid., pp. 745 et seq.), 
where the Court of Appeal of Paris reversed the decision of the 
Tribunal de commerce de la Seine that a contract for the supply of 
goods to be imported into Switzerland was a commercial transaction 
("acre de gestion") (ibid., p. 746). Such hesitations persist throughout 
the historical development of French case-law; see an interesting 
commentary by D. Yiannopoulos in regard to the case Corporacion 
del Cobre v. Braden Copper Corporation et Societe Le groupement 
d'importation des metaux (1972), in Revue generale de droit interna-
tional public (Paris), vol. 77 (1913), p. 1240. See also, for summary of 
45. This distinction, which differentiates between 
commercial activities or trading operations conducted 
by a State in respect of which there is no jurisdictional 
immunity and other activities of a State of non-com-
mercial or non-trading nature for which there could 
be State immunity, serves to restrict or limit the scope 
and extent of State immunity, rather than to extend it 
to every imaginable type of non-commercial activity 
which may still fall within the ambit of other categories 
of exceptions to the general rule of jurisdictional 
immunity. The various distinctions so far considered 
could each, or in combination, serve as a basis for 
denying or rejecting a claim of State immunity. Thus, 
an act or operation or activities performed or con-
ducted by or on behalf of a State could answer the 
definition of "commercial transactions" or "trading 
activities", for which no immunity need be accorded. 
The grounds for "non-immunity" in cases of commer-
cial transactions could e'l.ually be based on anyone or 
two or more of the distmctions between the various 
types of activities of State, such as the dual personality 
of a State, as political entity and as a civil or corporate 
entity; "Etat commerfant", or the dual capacity in 
which a State may act as a sovereign authority or as a 
private person. Immunity could be denied in respect of 
commercial activities on the ground that such activities 
form part of a series of acts jure gestionis, or "actes de 
gestion privee" or "actes d'administration". Immunity 
could indeed be withheld in respect of trading activities 
on the basis of the private or private-law nature of the 
activities involved. A narrower but perhaps a more 
widely recognizable ground for disallowing a claim of 
State immunity appears to be, first and foremost, that 
of trading activities or commercial transactions. 
B. Trading or commercial activity as an exception 
to State immunity 
1. IDENTIFIABILITY OF TRADING OR COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY 
46. The most common place or common ground for 
an apparent excep.tion to the rule of State immunity is 
likely to be claSSified as trading or commercial activi-
ties. An activity attributable to a State which could be 
qualified as "trading" or "commercial" is readily 
identifiable as acts, transactions, operation or course of 
conduct which may, with sufficient clarity, be generally 
visible, easily understood and as such, practically 
meaningful in the light of past experience. Because of 
the relative ease with which its content is understood 
and comprehensible, the term "trading or commercial 
activity" has been adopted for convenience' sake as a 
starting point. Not unlike other terms which require 
precise definition, the expression has to be further 
clarified, as it has earlier received some clarification in 
connection with the use of terms in draft article 2, para. 
1(f) (Use of terms)SI and further practical guidance in 
draft article 3, para. 2 (Interpretative provisions).s2 
47. "Trading or commercial activity" has been de-
fined as including not only a particular commercial 
transaction or a particular commercial act having a 
this case in English, International Legal Materials (Washington, 
D.C.), vol. XII, No.1 (1973), p. 182. 
SI See footnote 9 above. 
S2See footnote 10 above. 
sufficiently close connection with the State of the forum 
but also an entire series of acts or transactions which 
constitute a regular course of commercial conduct. 
Thus a commercial transaction or operation or act or 
contract, or the combination of several of such activi-
ties, will be considered as forming part of conduct 
traditionally associated with trade or commerce. The 
idea of profit or speculation is not foreign to trading. It 
has sometimes been suggested that a criterion to be 
used in identifying or determining a "trading or com-
mercial activity" is the objective nature or character of 
the particular act or transaction or course of conduct or 
activity, rather than its motivation or p~. This 
objective criterion has been proposed as an mitial step, 
since in most cases its application is decisive in deter-
mining the availability or applicability of State immun-
ity. This is designed to promote precision, to ensure 
clarity and to remove uncertainties. It will be seen in 
the course of the examination of State practice whether 
this initial criterion will need further ramifications, and 
to what extent reference to the motive or purpose of a 
particular act or transaction will be needed to clarify 
what otherwise could appear to be doubtful cases of 
State activities that are predominantly non-commercial 
in essence and substance, although clearly commercial 
in regard to the nature of the transaction involved. A 
more detailed examination and the analysis of concrete 
cases in actual State practice will afford further guid-
ance in the study of this topic. 
48. It will be seen through the evolution of various 
case-laws that the same court at different periods and 
various courts of different systems have reached differ-
ent conclusions regarding State immunities in the 
context of the exception which is entitled "trading and 
commercial activity". It is difficult for the courts to 
overlook completely the motivation of a particular 
transaction or contract, although its nature is clearly 
commercial or that of private law, especially when it is 
a contract for the purchase or supply of, for instance, 
materials for the establishment of an embassy,S3 con-
struction materials for an army or navy or air force,S4 
supplies for the maintenance of an army or a military 
basess or food supplies to relieve famine in an area 
suffering from natural calamity ~/or instance, to assist 
victims of flood or earthquake. Hard cases need not 
S3See , for example, the ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court 
in the Federal Republic of Germany in the case Xv. Empire of. . . 
[Iran] (1963) (see footnote 43 above). 
S4See, for example, the case Gouvernement espagnol v. Ouaux 
g849) (Dalloz, RecueiJ periodique et critique de jurisprudence, 1849 Paris), part I, p. 9), concerning the purchase of boots by the Spanish 
overnment for the Spanish army. Cf. Hanukiew case (1933) 
(Annual Digest . .. , 1933-1934 (London), vol. 7 (1940), case No. 66, 
pp. 174-175), concerning the purchase of arms; and various loan 
cases, such as the Moroccan Loan, Laurans v. Gouvernement du 
Maroc (1934) (Sirey, RecueiJ general des lois et des a"ets, 
1935 (Paris). part I, p'p. 103-104. and Revue crilique de droit 
international (Darras) (Paris), vol. XXX (1935). p. 795). See also 
Vavasseur v. Krupp (1878) (United Kingdom. The Law Reports, 
Chancery Division, vol. IX (1878), p. 351). 
sSSee, for "example, the case Trendtex Trading Corporation Ltd. v. 
The Central Bank of Nigeria (1977) (The AU Englalid Law Reports, 
1977, vol. I, p. 881) concerning the order of cement for the 
construction of barracks in Nigeria. Cf. Gugenheim v. State of 
Vietnam (Appeals Court, Paris, 1955) (lnternational Law Reports, 
1955 (London), vol. 22 (1958). pp. 224-225) (judgment upheld by the 
Cour de Cassation, 1961 (Revue generate de aroit international pUblic 
(Paris), vol. 66 (1962),~. 654» concerning the purchase of cigarettes 
tor the Vietnamese natIOnal army. 
56See , for example, Egyptian Delta Rice Mills Co. v. Comis4ria 
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make bad law, although they may serve to obscure 
lOme of the finer lines of delineation between cases 
where immunity is applicable and those where the court 
has preferred to exercise jurisdiction, particularly in the 
field of trading. A caveat is therefore lod~ed to empha-
size the need to approach certain sensitive areas with 
the greatest caution, lest an important act of sovereign 
authority to ensure the safety and security of nationals 
of a State be misconstrued as a simple commercial 
activi'r unclothed with jurisdictional unmunity. This 
objective criterion tends to be formal, and at times 
mechanical. Although useful and serviceable in most 
cases, it may need re-examination at closer ran~e, since 
circumstances might require penetration of thIS test. 
2. THE CURRENT PRAcneE OF STATES REGARDING 
TRADING OR COMMERCIAL AC11VlTY 
49. An inductive approach requires an examination of 
State practice on tills particular point of ''trading or 
commercial activity", which is regarded as a first excep-
tion to State immunity. In any examination of State 
practice it is necessary to observe the evolutionary 
character of the practice of States in aU related fields 
through the passage of time. State practice, like the 
evolution of regal principles and norms of international 
law, cannot be considered out of context of the time 
dimension. Time is an essential dimension, a consti-
tuent element of legal rules which are applicable only 
durin~ a period which could have a more or less definite 
duratIon. The relativity of temporal existence and the 
application of a legal norm cannot be overlooked. As 
will be seen, in a particular legal system State practice 
changes, develops and evolves through time and with 
the passage of tIme. The practice of several countries 
does not necessarily follow the same pattern of evolu-
tion within the same time-frame. On the whole, the 
emerJing trends represent the overall picture of State 
practIce, judicial and governmental, as well as legisla-
tive and treaty practice. The application of the rule on 
State immunity is a two-way street in the sense that 
each State, each Government, is a potential recipient 
or beneficiary of State immunity as well as being in the 
position of having to fulfil the obligation to give effect 
to jurisdictional immunity enjoyed by another State. 
SO. The practice of States, in various forms, reflects 
the various factors, elements and developments in the 
extensions of functions or roles assumed by States in 
the field of economic activities. It will be seen that even 
from the very beginning, when the doctrine of State 
immunity was first conceived and applied, concern was 
voiced and reservation expressed WIth regard to trading 
or commercial activities. This was the case even in the 
most traditional of State practice favouring what could 
be viewed as the most unqualified recognition and 
application of State immunity. 57 One of the reasons for 
General de Abastecimientos y Transportes de Madrid (1943) (Annual 
Digest . .. , 1943-1945 (London), vol. 12 (1949), case No. 27, pp. 
103-104), cited in Sucharitkul, loco cit., p. 138 (see footnote 38 
above. in fine). 
S1See , for example, the dictum of Lord Stowell in The "Swift" 
(1813) (J. Dodson, Reports of Oues argued and determined in the 
High Court of Admirtilty (London, Butterworth, 1815), vol. I, p. 
320); 
"The utmost that I can venture to admit is, that, if the King 
traded, as some sovereigns do. he m!ght fall within the operation 
of these statutes (Navtgation ActsJ. Some sovereigns have a 
monopoly of certain commodities, in which they traffick on the 
(~",.-".,.") 
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allowing immunity to operate even in the earliest cases 
bas been the absence of commercial nature of the act or 
activities involved. 58 A taint of commercial activity has 
been known to disqualify or nUllify a claim of State 
immunity. In one of the earliest cases in which the 
exception of trading was reco~ed and applied in 
State practice,59 the judge, Sir Robert Phillimore, 
observed: 
... No principle of intemationallaw, and no decided case, and no 
dictum of jurists of which I am aware, has gone so far as to authorize 
a sovereign prince to assume tbe character of a trader, when it is for 
his benefit; and when he incurs an obligation to a private subject to 
throw off, if I may so speak, his disguise, and appear as a sovereign, 
claiming for his own benefit, and to the injury of a private person, for 
the first time, all the attributes of his character.60 
51. It will also be seen that while the proposition that 
trading constitutes an exception to State immunity has 
encountered relatively little opposition, the actual ap-
plication of that proposition bas not been without 
doubts and hesitations. The same set of facts could be 
construed differently by different courts at various 
levels with surprisingly divergent or even opposing 
results. The same activity could be viewed as trading 
not entitled to State immunity or as non-commercial 
and therefore covered by State immunity.61 
(a) Judicial practice 
(i) International adjudication 
52. As has been noted, the relativity and uncertainty 
of rules of State immunity, especially in respect of the 
scope and extent of their application in State practice, 
are in some measure accountable for the relative 
silence of judicial pronouncements on an international 
level. The only case recently decided by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, in 1980,62 which has a direct 
(F_ 57 collti~d.) 
common principles that other traders traffick; and, if the King of 
England so possessed and so exercised any monopoly, I am not 
prepared to say that he must not conform his traffick to the 
general rules by which all trade is regulated." (Ibid., p. 339.) 
S8For instance, neither in The Schooner "Exchange" v. McFaddon 
and others (1812) (W. Cranch, Reports of Cases argued and adjudged 
in the Supreme Court of the United States (New York, 1911), vol. VII 
(3rd ed." p. 116) nor in The "Prins Frethrik" (1820) (Dodson, op. 
cit., vol. II (1815-1822), p. 451) was the ship in question a commer-
cial vessel employed in commercial services. 
S9The "Charkieh" (1873) (United Kingdom, The Law Reports, 
High Court of Admiralty and Ecclesiastical Courts, vol. IV (1875), p. 
59) was the first case where the commercial nature of the service or 
employment of a public ship was held to disentitle her from State 
immunities. 
60 Ibid., pp. 99-100. This decision, with Sir Robert Phillimore's 
instructive judgment, was cited with approval by an absolutist writer, 
C. F. Gabba, "De la competence des tribunaux a l'egard des 
souverains et des Etats etrangers", Journal de droit international 
prive (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 16 (1889), p. 539, and ibid., vol. 17 
(1890), p. 41. Cf. also his decision in The "Parlement beige" (1879) 
(United Kingdom, The Law Reports, Probate Division, 1879, vol. IV, 
p. 129). 
61The Parlement beige itself (see footnote 60 above) was consid-
ered by Sir Robert Phillimore, after reviewing English and Amer-
ican cases, as being "neither a I?ublic ship of war nor a private vessel 
of pleasure", and thus not entitled to immunity. This decision. was 
reversed by the Court of Appeal (1880) (United Kingdom, The Law 
Reports, Probate Division,188O, vol. V, p. 197); see Lord Justice 
Brett (ibid., p. 203). 
62See the Judgment of the ICJ of 24 May 1980, United States 
DiplomtJlic and Consular Staff in Tehran, I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 3, 
mentioned in the Special Rapporteur's second report (Yearbook . .. 
bearing on the 'luestion of inviolability rather than the 
usual type of junsdictional immunity of State property, 
did not touch upon the exception of trading or commer-
cial activity connected with the premises of the embassy 
or the consulate. This may serve to illustrate the 
flexible nature of attitudes and positions of Govern-
ments. By not pursuing the matter on the international 
level, a State affected by an adverse judicial decision of 
a foreign court may remain silent at the risk of ac-
quiescing in the judgment or the treatment given. 
States are none the less further protected by the 
second-sta~e immunity from seizure, attachment and 
execution m respect of their property once a judgment 
has been rendered or obtained which may affect them 
adversely. The relative paucity of judicial orders re-
quiring execution may account for the absence of 
international litigation or adjudication. This does not 
preclude the existence of a rule of law on the subject. 
(ii) Judicial decisions of municipal courts 
53. An inductive approach to State practice on this 
particular issue of "t~ading <?r commercial activity" ~ an 
exception to State tmmuDlty has to be systematic as 
well as analytical, rather than historical or chronologi-
cal. Inescapably, however, the relevance of time-span or 
time-frame, the temporal dimension, is often indicative 
if not determinative of the progressive phase of legal 
developments. An examination of the practice of each 
State may indicate a progressive development at differ-
ent paces, backward as well as forward, not altogether 
uniriftuenced br other relevant and material factors 
such as econOmIC restructuring or political upheavals in 
a particular State or region. Case-law in each country 
tends to grow and evolve, bringing about changes and 
novelties that may for a time prevail. The current 
judicial practice may be said to point towards a clear 
reaffirmation of the exception of "trading or commer-
cial activity" as fully endorsed by judicial decisions, and 
firmly reinforced if not directly assisted sometimes by 
national legislation, or even bilateral treaties and inter-
national or regional conventions. 
54. State practice has continued to move in favour of 
a generally restrictive trend since the advent of State 
trading and the continuing expansion of State activities 
in the field of economic development. The epithet 
"absolute" in respect of immunity was unknown at the 
inception of the principles of State immunity. State 
practice, even at the very beginning, was never abso-
lute, but carefully selected the categories of cases in 
which foreign States were immune, viz., foreign 
sovereigns, ambassadors, the passage of foreign armed 
forces or warships.63 Trading was theoretically outside 
1980, vol. II (Part One), p. 227, document A/CN.4/331 and Add.I, 
para. 114); cf. the Permanent Court's decision of 15 June 1939 in 
Societe commerciale de Belgique, P.C.I.J., Series AI B, No. 78, p. 
160. 
63 See, e.g., Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner "Exchange" v. 
McFaddon and others (1812) (Cranch, op. cit., fP. 137-139, (see 
footnote 58 above», who gave three instances 0 exception to the 
exercise of territorial jurisdiction: 
(1) The exemption of the person of the sovereign from arrest and 
detention within a foreign territory; . 
(2) The immunity which al\ civilized nations allowed to foreign 
ministers; and 
(3) The implied cession of a portion of his territorial jurisdiction 
where he allows the troops of a foreign prince to pass through his 
dominion. 
the operation of the doctrine of State immunity even at 
the very start ,64 although in the actual application of the 
general rule of State immunity, differing tnterpretations 
have been given to the same or similar type of State 
activities by various courts in the same and other 
countries at various times. The movement of State 
practice in its progressive evolution may be likened to 
that of a snake, which can move sideways by swinging 
and swaying its body to the left and right, with intermit-
tent ups-and-downs in zig-zagging pattern. 
55. Thus the case-law of countries such as Italy, 
Belgium and Egypt, which could be said to have led the 
field of "restrictive immunity", denying immunity in 
regard to trading activities, may now have been over-
taken by the recent practice of countries traditionally 
for a more unqualified doctrine of State immunity, such 
as the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States 
of America and the United Kingdom. The restrictive 
trenc;ls appear to prevail in every direction, with the 
result that the exception of "trading or commercial 
activity" may be said to have become firmly ensconced 
as a well-settled and established practice of customary 
international law. It is the first step of minimum ex-
ception, although not always unchallenged as a matter 
of practical necessity nor generally free from theoreti-
cal and doctrinal controversies. It should be empha-
sized, none the less, that the challenge to "trading or 
commercial activity" as an exception to State immunity 
has come from certain quarters as a matter of policy or 
principle without an,}' evidence of contrary practice in 
terms of judicial deCIsions. Views of Governments are 
certainly r~levant, and could influence legal develop-
ments in their own right. They may indeed provide a 
lead for judicial decisions in certain areas, as they have 
done in some countries where consent and reciprocity 
play a prominent role or where the determination of 
State immunity is considered as a responsibility shared 
by the courts and the political arms of the Government. 
The primary concern of this particular section of the 
re~rt is the current evidence of judicial practice, a 
bnef general survey of which on this point deserves 
close attention and careful examination. It should be 
observed at this point that the present inquiry is not 
confined to the practice of industrialized countries of 
the Western world, but is intended to cover all States 
generally. In any event, the Special Rapporteur is not 
expected to su,?plement want of judicial decisions with 
his own inventions or speculations. 
Italy 
56. The States which in practice appear to have 
recognized trading or commercial activIt.}' as an excep-
tion to State immunity from the very begtnning include 
Italy, Belgium and Egypt. The courts of Italy were the 
first, in 1882, to limit the application of State immunity 
to cases where the foreign State has acted as an "ente 
64 According to Chief Justice Marshall (ibid., p. 145): "A prince, by 
acquiring private property in a foreign country, may possibly be 
considered as subjecting that property to the temtorial jurisdiction" . 
When a sovereign "descended into the market place, he should be 
treated on a par with a private trader" (quoted in the Harvard draft, 
oI'. cit., p. 473). See also Bank ofth~ Unit~d Stcll~S v. Plant~rs' Bank 
of G~rgiIJ (1824) (H. Wheaton, R~ports of Cas~ arg~d and 
lIIIirui~din the Suprmte Court of the Unued Suues (New York, 1911), 
vol. IX, 4th cd., pp. 904 and 9(7). 
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politico" as opposed to a "corpo morale" ,65 or in the 
capacity of a sovereign authority or political power 
(Potere politico) as distinguished from a persona civile. 
State immunity was accorded only in respect of "atti 
d'impero", and not "atti di gestione".66 The public 
nature of a State act was a criterion by which immunity 
was determined. Immunity was not recognized for 
private acts or acts of private law nature.67 It was not 
unnatural that commercial activities of a foreign Gov-
ernment answering various denominations of the types 
of activities not covered by State immunity on the basis 
of the various distinctions made were held to constitute 
an exception to State immunity. 68 
57. In a case decided by the Court of Appeal of 
Genoa in 1925, the French Government was held 
responsible in respect of a contract to tow ships from 
Cattaro to La Spezia, apparently one of private law 
nature to be performed in Italy. "When a foreign State 
engapes in a purely commercial activity,* and, in the 
admmistration of its property, operates more et jure 
privatorum", said the Court, "it appears to be no 
different from any foreign juristic person."69 The cur-
rent 'practice of Italian couns follows the same line of 
restnctive principles, confining immunity to atti di 
sovranita. Thus, tn a more recent case decided in 1955 
concerning a United States military base established in 
Italy in accordance with the North Atlantic Treaty, the 
Court of Cassation granted immunity in respect of 
"l'attivitcl pubblicistica" connected with the "funzioni 
pubbliche 0 politiche" of the United States 
Government.70 Later decisions confirmed the applica-
tion of such distinctions, holding, in one case, an 
employee of an overseas office of the United States 
Information Agency to be "un ente od ufficio statale 
americano . .. che agisce all'estero sotto la direzione ed 
il controllo del Segretario di Stato . . . per la persecu-
zione di r.ni pubblici sovrani dello Stato americana 
come tale' to be an "impiegato di uno Stato" and "per 
dejinizione impiegato pubblico",11 and, in another case, 
holding the employment by the Romanian Government 
of an employee of an economic agency forming an 
65 Mor~ll~tv. Gov~mo Dan~~ (1882) (see footnote 32 above); cited 
in the Harvard draft, op. cit., pp. 481-482. 
66Guttieres v. Elmilik (1886) (see footnote 34 above). See also 
Hamspohn v. B~y di Tunisi (1887) (see footnote 35 above) and 
TypaidCIs, Console di Gr~cia v. Manicomio di Av~rsa (1886) (see 
footnote 37 above). 
"Carlo d'AustriIJ v. Nobili (1921) (see footnote 42 above). Cf. 
P~rucch~tti v. Puig y Casarauno (1928) (see footnote 43 above). 
68Stor~lli v. Gov~mo della R~pubblica Franc~e (1924) (see foot· 
note 47 above) and the Ttsini case (1924) (see footnote 49 above). 
69Gov~rno Franc~s~ v. S~"a ~d aitri (1925) (Rivista di dimto 
int~rnazional~ (Rome), 17th year, series III, vol. IV (1925), p. 540): 
"Quando uno Stato estero estrinseca una attivita meramente patri-
moniale, e, amministrando i suoi beni, opera mor~ ~t jur~ privatorum, 
non altrimenti esso appare che Quale persona giuridica straniera" 
(cited and trans. in the Harvard draft, op. cit., p. 480). Cf., on the 
other hand, F . .Advokaat v. I. Schuddinck eft den Belgisch~n Staat 
(1923) (see footnote 41 above), where the Netherlands court held a 
service of tug boats to be an act of public administration. 
7\) D~partment of the .Army of th~ United Srat~ ot Am~rica v. Gori 
Sav~llini (1955) (Rivista di dirino internazional~ (Milan), vol. XXXIX 
(1956), p'p. 91-92, and Int~nuuional Law R~ports, 1956 (London), 
vol. 23 (l960),p. 201). Cf. La M~rcantil~ v. R~gno di Gr~ciIJ (1955) 
(Rivista di diritto int~rnazional~ (Milan), vol. XXXVIII (1955), p. 
376, and Int~r1Ultio1Ul1 Law R~ports. 1955 (London), vol. 22 (1958). 
p.240). 
71 D~ Ritis v. Gov~rno d~gli Stati Uniti d'Am~rica (1971) (Rivista di 
dirilto internazional~ (Milan), vol. LV (1972), pp. 483, at 485-486). 
---~--------
114 
integral part of the Romanian Embassy in Italy to be of 
a non-commercial character. 72 
Belgium 
58. The Belgian case-law was settled as early as 1857 
in a trilogy of cases involving the guano monopoly of 
Peru.73 A distinction was drawn between public and 
private activities of the State, and the Court of Appeal 
of Brussels was able to deny immunity in respect of 
activities connected With the business enterprise of 
Peru. Trading activities have since been regarded as an 
area where no immunity would be allowed. Thus, in 
another later case decided by the Court of Appeal of 
Gent in 1879,74 the court refused the claim of immunity 
in an action for freight on guano shipped for Ostend. 
The principles on which sovereign immunity was based 
were not considered violated if the foreign Government 
engaged in commercial contracts. The court said: . 
... this principle [of the sovereignty of nations] may indeed be 
applicable when a government, within the limit of its functions as a 
government,· takes measures in the interest of its preservation or for 
activities dictated by the general interest, but there can no longer be 
any question of it being applicable when a government sells guano 
and, either directly or through intermediaries, takes actions and 
enters into contracts which, always and everywhere, have been 
considered to be commercial contracts,· subject to the jurisdiction of 
commercial courts; ... 75 
59. This limitation concerning State trading has been 
followed in a number of subsequent decisions, such as 
one in a case concerning the selling of supplies to the 
Ottoman Government in 191076 and, another, the 
purchase of goods by a forei~n Government for the 
purpose of resale on commercial lines to its nationals, 
m 1927.77 Like the Italian courts, the Belgian courts 
since 1888 also have adopted the distinction between 
acts of the State in its sovereign (public) and civil 
(private) capacity, holding that, in concluding a con-
tract for the purchase of bullets, Bulgaria acted as a 
private person and subjected itself to all the civil 
consequences of the contract.78 Similarly, a contract to 
enlarge a railway station in Holland was held amenable 
to Belgian jurisdiction in 1903, not so much on account 
of any theory of consent, express or implied, but on the 
72LufUJ v. Repubblica socialisUl di Romania (1974) (ibid., vol. 
LVIII (1975), p. 597). 
73The three cases were the following: 
(1) Elal du perou v. Kreglinger (1857) (La Belgique judiciaire 
(Brussels), vol. XVII (1859), p. 331). Cf. E. W. Allen, The Position 
of Foreign SUlles before 13elgian Courts (New York, Macmillan, 
1929). See also the decision of the Court of Appeal of Brussels of 30 
December 1840 in the case Sociele generale pour favoriser I'industrie 
IIDlionale v. Syndical d'amortissement, Gouvernemenl neerlandais 
el Gouvernement beige (Pasicrisie beige, 1841 (Brussels), part 2, 
p.33). 
(2) "Peruvian Loans" case (1877) (La Belgique judiciaire (Brus-
sels), vol. XXV (1877), p. 1185). The case was brought not against 
Peru but its exclusive agent for the sale of guano in Europe, the 
Dreyfus Brothers, of Paris. 
(3) Peruvian Guano Company v. Dreyfus et consorts el Ie 
Gouvemement du perou (1880) (ibid., vol. XXXIX (1881), p. 
1394). 
74The Havre case: Rau, Vanden Abeele el Cie v. Duruty (1879) 
(Pasicrisie beige, 1879 (B~ls),part 2, p. 175). 
75Ibid., p. 176: cited in the Harvard draft, op. Cil., p. 613. 
76Gouvememenl imperial ottoman v. Gaspary (1910) (Pasicrisie 
beige, 1911 (Brussels), part 3, p. 105). 
77 Monnoyer el Bernard v. EUlI franrais (1927) (see footnote 38 
above). 
78 Sodile pour la fabricalion de CIIr/ouches v. Colonel MUlkuroff, 
"nature of the act· and the capacity in which the State is 
involved in it". 79 The distinction between acta jure 
imperii and acta jure gestionis has been recognized by 
Belgian courts since 190~ and has been consistently 
applied in subsequent cases_ 81 
Egypt 
60. The Mixed Courts of E~t were consistent in 
their adherence to the Italo-Bel~an practice of limited 
immunity. As early as 1920, a distinction between acts 
jure gestionis and jure imperii was recognized. In an 
action for damages for maritime collision involving a 
vessel belonging to the British Crown, the Mixed Court 
of Appeal of Alexandria denied the plea of immunity 
"invoked by the State· , which acted· purely as a simple 
individual or a civil person·".82 In a long line of cases, 
immunity was not allowed in respect of commercial 
transactions. Thus the renting of a furnished villa was 
held, in a 1927 case, to be a "contrat de droit prive" as 
opposed to an "acte de puissance publ~ue".83 The 
operation of a State Railways Administration was also 
considered in a 1942 case to be an act of private. 
administration as opposed to an "acte de 
souverainete".84 The courts applied an objective cri-
terion of the "nature of the transaction" very strictly in 
denying immunity in respect of trading activities, hold-
ing the activities of the two organs of the Spanish 
Government to be "undertakings of a commercial 
character."85 A contract for the purchase of an immov-
able property to be used as an "hOtel diplomatique" was 
also regarded as an "acte de gestion" and therefore 
subject to local jurisdiction.86 Whether a State enter-
prise was separately incorporated or was integrated 
mto the machinery of government of the foreign State, 
if its activity was that of a commercial enterprise having 
the character of a private undertaking, such as the 
ministre de la guerre de la principaule de Bu/garie (1888) (see footnote 
36 above). 
79 Sociele anonyme des chemins de fer Jiegeois-Iuxembourgeois v. 
EUlI neerlandllis (Minislere du WalersUlaI) (1903) (Pasicrisie beige, 
1903 (Brussels), part 1, p. 294); cited in the Harvard draft, op. cil., 
Pf' 613-614. See also the decision of the Tribunal civil de Bruxelles 
o 22 May 1901 (Journal des tribufUJUX belges (Brussels), 1901, p. 
1127), where the court upheld jurisdiction and applied article 92 of 
the COnstitution. 
MlFeidman v. EUlI de Bahia (1907) (see footnote 38 above). 
81 See, for example, Dhellemes el Masurel v. Banque centrale 
de la Re1!ublique de Turquie (1963) (Journal des tribunaux belges 
(Brussels), 19 January 1964, p. 44); and Socobelge el Elal beige v. 
Etal hellenique, Banque de Grece, el Banque de Bruxelles (1951) 
(JourfUJl due droil inlernalional (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 79 (1952), pp. 
244-266, notes of A. Deveze and M. R. Hennebicq). See also E. Suy, 
"L'immunite des Etats dans la jurisf.!rudence beIge", L'immunite de 
juridiclion el d'execulion des EUlts (Brussels. Institut de socioloj!ie, 
1971), pp. 279 el seq.; and L. Plouvier, "L'immunite de contramte 
des Communautes europl!ennes", Revue beige de droit internalional 
(Brussels), vol. IX (1973), p. 471. 
82The S.S. "Sumatra" case (1920) (see footnote 39 above). 
83 Zaki bey Gabra v. R. E. Moore Esq. el aUlre (1927) (see footnote 
39 above). 
84 Gouvernement egyptien v. Chemins de fer de I' Elal paieslinien 
(1942) (Bulletin de legislation el de jurisprudence egypliennes (Alex-
andria), vol. 54 (1941-1942), part 2, p. 242). 
85 Egyptian DelUl Rice Mills Co. v. Comisarla General de Abasleci-
mientos y Transpor/es de Madrid (1943) (see footnote 56 above). The 
Mixed Courts were wound up in 1949. 
86S. E. Echref BadnjeviC es qua/ile de Ministre de Yougoslavie en 
Egypre v. W. R. Fanner (1947) (Journal du droit intemtUionai 
(aunet) (Paris), vols. 73-76 (1946-1949), p. 113). 
National Saving Bank of France, the courts were 
prepared to exerciSt. jurisdiction.87 
61. The current case-law of post-war Egypt has con-
firmed the jurisprudence of the Mixed Courts. Jurisdic-
tional immunities of foreign States constitute a question 
of "ordre public", or a matter of public policy.88 
Immunity IS only accorded in respect of acts of 
sovereign authoriiy89 and does not extend to "ordinary 
acts" which are not related to the exercise of sovereign-
ty and "commercial acts".90 
France 
62. Earlier French case-law was more inclined to-
wards unlimited immunity. In the famous case decided 
in 1849 concerning the purchase of boots by the Spanish 
90ve~ment for the. Spanis.h army, the court, basing 
lDlmumty on the reCiprocal mdependence of soverei$n 
States, defined jurisdiction as "a right inherent in Its 
sovereign authority, which another government cannot 
arrogate to itself without running the risk of adversely 
~e~tin~ their respective relati~ns" .91 The attempted 
distmctlOn between "Etat pUISsance pub/ique" and 
"Etat personne privee" was rejected throughout the 
19th century.92 As late as 1912, the Court of Appeal of 
Paris still rejected the dual personality of the State. The 
court said: 
~o distinction should be made between the . . . public personality 
which would not be subject to foreign jurisdiction and the legal 
personality which would, on the contrary, be subject to it, since all 
the acts of a State can have only one goal and one end, which are 
always political, and its unity precludes such dualism.93 
63. Amidst a general confusion created by long-
standing controversies of theoretical importance 
between the Cour de Cassation and inferior courts 
notably the Cour d' Ap~1 de Paris, as regards the tru~ 
nature of State immunity94 as "immunite de juridiction" 
trT Borg v. Caisse nationale d'epargne frarlfaise (1926) (Gaune des 
tribunaux mutes d'Egypte (Alexandria), vol. 16, No. 185 (March 
1926), p. 123); (Annual Digest 1925-1926 (London), vol. 3 (1929), 
case No. 122, p. 171). 
88See the reply of Egypt to question 3 of the questionnaire 
addressed to Governments in 1979, in United Nations, Materillls on 
Jurisdictional Immunities ... , p. 569: and decision 1173 of 1963 of 
the Cairo Court of First Instance, published on 8 June 1964. 
f91dem, and the decisions of 29 March 1943 of the Tribunal de 
Commerce of Alexandria, of 12 May 1951 of the Civil Court of 
Alexandria and of 10 March 1960 of the Giza Court of First Instance. 
~See the. reply of Egypt to question 7 of the questionnaire, in 
Untted Nattons, Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities ... , p. 569. 
91 Gouvemement espagnol v. Casaux (1849) (see footnote 54 
above). See, for example, E. W. Allen, The Position of Foreign Suues 
before French Courts (New York, Macmillan, 1929); and Hamson, 
Ioc. cit., p. 293 (see footnote 40 above). 
92 See , for example, Ministere public v. DemoiseUe Masset (1870) 
(Dallal, Recueil periodique et critique de jurispnu:lence 1871 (Paris), 
part 2, p. 9), concerning the Tsar of Russia; Htri.tiers de I'empereur 
MaximiJitn v. Lemaitre (1872) (ibid., 1873, part 2, p. 24), concerning 
the Em~ror Maximilien of Mexico; Isabelle de Bourbon v. Me/lerio 
(1872) (ibid., 1872, part 2, p. 124), concerning the ex-Queen of Spain 
tsabeUa II; Witrcinski v. Seyyid Ali bert Hamond (1916) (JoUl7Ul! du 
~it international (aunet), (Paris), vol. 44 (1917), p. 1465"), concern-
mg the ex-Sultan of Zanzibar. 
93 Gamen-Humbert v. Euu russe (1912) (Dallal, Recueil plriodique 
et critique de jurispnu:lence, 1913 (paris), part 2, p. 201, note by G. 
Gidel); the judgment was no doubt inspired by the decision of the 
Prussian Court of Jurisdictional Conflicts in Hellfeld v. den Fiskus des 
russischen Reiches (Zeitschrift far IfIlemlllioluUes Recht (see footnote 
120 below). 
94~e J: P. Niboyet, ."Immunite de juridiction et inco~tence 
d'aunbutton", Revue cruique de droit interNIIionai priv# (Pans), vol. 
XXXIX (1950), p. 139. 
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or "incompetence d'attribution", later French case-law 
atteml?ted to qualify "immunite de juridiction" by 
confirimg immunity to cases in which the defendant 
acted in a capacity different from that of a State, such as 
an agent or mandataire of one of its nationals,9S or a 
universal legatee ,96 and to restrict "incompetence d'at-
trlbution" on account of the function fulfilled, granting 
immunity only "ratione nu:derille". f17 French courts have 
in fact applied both theories concurrently so that 
immunity· has been denied either ratione personae 
because of the non-sovereign capacity or qualitl in 
which the State acts, or ratione materille because 0 the 
nature of the act in question. The overriding test 
preferred by the Cour de Cassation of "incompetence 
tI' attribution", or "the nature of the act" , has served to 
confine State immunity to State acts commonly desig-
nated as "actes de puissance publique, de ,ouveme-
ment, d'autorite, desouverainete, d'imperium' or "actes 
politiques" as opposed to "actes de commerce".98 
64. Traces of certain limitations based on the distinc-
tion between the State as "puissance publique" and as 
"personne privee'" and between "acte d'autorite" and 
"acte de gestion" or "acte de commerce" could be found 
in the judgments of lower courts as early as 1890.99 It 
was not until 1918 that a restrictive theory of immunity 
was formulated and adopted by French tribunals. 
Accepting the functional limitation of State immunity, 
the Cour d' Appel de Rennes declined jurisdiction in a 
case on the ground that the vessel was employed "not 
for a commercial purpose and for private interests, but 
... for the requirements of national defence, beyond 
any idea of profit or speculation . . ." .100 The first case 
in which the restrictive theory was applied with the 
result of non-immunity was the Lakhowsky case, de-
cided in 1919, concerning the activities of the Office 
Suisse des Transports Ext~rieurs, holding the contract 
for the purchase of goods to be transported into 
Switzerland to be a commercial transaction, an "acte de 
9SSee the Vestwig case: Procureur ~neral pres fa Cour de cassation 
v. Vestwig et autres (1946) (Sirey, Recueil general des lois et des Qrrets , 
1947 (Paris), ~rt I, p. 137); Credit foncitr d'Alserie et de Tunisie v. 
Restrepo et aepartement d'Antioqu/Q (1922) (Annual Di8est ... 
1919-1922 (London), vol. 1 ~1932), case No. 201, p. 285), for an 
action against the charge d affaires of Colombia; see also the 
conclusions of Judge L. Lyon-Caen (La Gazene du PaJais (Paris, 
1923), 1st semester, p. 439). 
96 Euu roumain v. Demoiselle Arricllstre et aUlres (Tribunal civil of 
Bordeaux, 1937) (Revue critique de droit international (Paris), vol. 
XXXIII (1938), p. 297, with a note by H. Batillol, p. 3(0); (Court of 
A~al of Paitiers, 1946) (Journal au droit international (Clunet) 
(Pans), vols. 7~76 (194&-1949), p. 6); Htri.tiers de Plessis-BeUrere v. 
Uon XI11, pape, comte RDmpo/lo ... (Tribunal civil of Momdidier, 
1892) (Journal de droit international prive (aunet) (Paris), vol. 19 
(1892), p. 447); (Cour d'~l of ~e!ls, 18(3) (ibid., vol. io (1893), 
p. 384); (Cour de cassanon, 1894) (ibid., vol. 21 (1894), p. 835). 
97 Epoux Martin v. Banque d'Espagne (1952) (ibid., vol. 80 (1953), 
p. 654); see also Banque d'Espagne IJe Bur~os v. Ba~ue d'Espagne 
IJe BarceloM et Banque de France (1938) (ibid., vol. 66 (1939), p. 70). 
-See, for exam=e, a note by J. B. Sialelli concerning the case 
Epoux Martin v. ue d'Espa M (1952) (Ioc. cit., pp. 656-657-
see footnote 97 above; the artie£: of J. P. Niboyet,loc. cit., p. 139 
(see footnote 94 above); a note by C. Rousseau concerning the 
HanuJciew case (1933) (Ioc. cit., p. 24~ footnote 54 above); and 
• note by N. Politis concerning .tb~ case Epoux Dessus v. Epoux 
Rieoy (1907) (DaIlOl, RecudJ pIrioaique et critique de jurisprudence, 
1907 (Paris), part 2, p. 281). 
99 Faucon et Cit v. Gouvemement grec (1890) (Journal du droit 
international prive (aunet) (Paris), vol. 17 (1890), p. 288). 
loo"Hunger/ord" case (1918) (1919) (see footnote 50 above). 
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commerce" subject to local jurisdiction.lol On appeal, 
in 1921, the Cour d'Appel de Paris did not fuid the 
contract to be of commercial nature, not having a "but 
commercial", and that the transaction "was motivated 
by concerns of international interest and domestic 
policy excluding anJ profit-seeking and any idea of 
speculation· ... "" It was not until 1924, however, 
that the Tribunal de Commerce de Marseille was able 
to hold the activities of a foreign Government amen-
able to French jurisdiction, characterizing the contract 
of purchase of goods to be resold to its nationals on 
ordinary commercial lines as a "commercial transac-
tion", forming part of the trading activities of the 
foreign Government. The operation of acts denomin-
ated "actes de commerce" "excludes any consideration 
concerning the exercise of the State's ~ublic authority, 
its independence and its sovereignty". 03 
65. The ex\,ression "actes de commerce" was used in 
this connectIon not in its technical sense of French 
procedure allocating jurisdiction between civil and 
commercial cases, but in the sense of "commercial 
transaction" or "trading activity". French courts as well 
as contemporary French commentators ap~ar to have 
preferred this term because it is convement, appro-
priate and familiar: "with it one is on relatively firm and 
familiar ground" .104 This theory of "acte de commerce" 
has inftuenced the main development in French case-
law. A restrictive view of immunity based on this 
theory has been adopted in a long line of cases decided 
by the ugper courts, especially in the so-called "Soviet 
cases", I starting in 1926 with the authorization of a 
saisie-arret by the Cour de Cassation against the assets 
of the Soviet Trade Delegation. 106 The Court observed: 
Transactions of a commercial character extending to all fields can 
only be regarded as ordinary commercial transactions having nothing 
in common with the principle of sovereignty of States. 107 
66. The current jurisprudence of France may be said 
to be settled in its adherence ot the restrictive principle 
101 Lokhowsky v. Office suisse des transports exterieurs (Tribunal de 
commerce de la Seine, 1919) (Revue de droit international prive 
(Darras) (Paris), vol. XVII (1921), p. 70). Immunity was limited to 
"activities being sovereign in nature or administrative activities, 
activities of public authority" (ibid., p. 72). 
Il12lbid., vol. XVIII (1922-1923), pp. 746-747. 
103 Etat roumain v. Pascalet et Cie (1924) (Journal du droit interna-
tional (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 52 (1925), p. 113; J. P. Niboyet, Traite de 
droit international prive fran~ais (Paris, Sirey, 1949), vol. VI, part 1, 
p.3465· 
IIWThus Niboyet observed in his Traite (op. cit.), vol. VI, part 1, p. 
350. He also s81d, in reply to E. Umonon, Rapporteur for the topic 
of immunity of foreign States from jurisdiction and measures of 
execution at the Sienna meeting of the Institute of International Law 
(April 1952): "I feel it would be better to use the term acte de 
commerce, which is more in keeping with the modem activity. of the 
State ... " (Annuaire de 1'Institut de droit international, 1952 (Basel), 
vol. 44, part I, pp. 1~131). 
I05See, for example, S. Sucharitkul, State Immunities and Trading 
Activities in International Low (London, Stevens, 1959), pp. 152-161; 
Hamson, loc. cit., pp. 309 et seq. (see footnote 40 above); and A. 
Stoupnitzky, "Le statut de l'URSS-COmmer~ant dans Ie droit 
conventionnel sovietique", Revue de droit international et de legisla-
tion comparee (Paris), vol. XVII (1936), p. SOl. 
I06Societe Ie Gostorg et Representation commerciale de I'URSS V. 
Association France-Export (1926) (Sirey, Recueil general des lois et 
des arrtts, 1930 (Paris), part 1, p. 49; summary and trans. in Annual 
Digest . .. , 1925-1926 (London). vol. 3 (1929), case No. 125, p. 174). 
1071bid., p. 175; see also Sirey, Recueil general . .. , pp. 49-50 for a 
note by Niboyet; and Dalloz periodique ... 1929 (Pans), part 1, p. 
75, for a note by R. Savatier. See also J. G. Castel, "Immunity of a 
foreign State from execution: French practice", The American Jour-
nal ollntemational Low (Washington, D.C.), vol. 46 (1952), p. 520. 
based on "trading activities". The more recent deci-
sions of the last two or three decades serve to illustrate 
the difficulties inherent in the actual application of the 
theory of the "acte de commerce", with curiously 
divergent results. Thus, the purchase of cigarettes for a 
foreign armyl08 and a contract for the survey of water 
distribution in PakistanlO9 were held to be "actes de 
puissance publique" for "service public", while a con-
tract of commercial lease of an office for a tourist 
organization of a forei~ GovernmentllO and the 
method of raising of pubhc loanslll gave rise to unend-
ing doubts and Ilesitations. Government guarantee of 
rents was regarded as an exercise of public authority, 112 
as was the regulation of exchange control by a central 
bank.l13 Oearly, in principle, immunity was confined to 
acts of public authority, "actes de puissance publique", 
or acts performed in the interest of a public service. It is 
based on the nature of activity as distmct from the status 
of the entity which performs it. A rail transport was 
held to be within the category of "commercial activi-
ties" not entitled to State immunity. 114 The practical 
difficulty is likely to continue, with fluctuating results 
ranging from the exercise of jurisdiction to assess the 
adequacy of com~nsation given by a forei~n govern-
ment for expropnationllS to the leasing of lmmovable 
properties and the floating of public loans. 116 
Federal Republic of Germany 
67. The practice of German courts has followed a 
somewhat zigzag course. It began as early as 1885 with 
restrictive immunity based on the distinction between 
public and private law activities, holding State immun-
lty to "suffer at least certain exceptions". 117 Between 
1905 and 1938, a more unlimited doctrine of immunity 
prevailed. The restrictive trend was reversed in a case 
concerning the Belgian State Railway in 1905118 and the 
Finnish State Railway in 1925,119 and the distinction 
I(JJGugenheim V. State of Vietnam (1955) (1961): see footnote 55 
above. 
I!1JSociete Transshipping V. Federation of Pakistan (1966) (Interna-
tional Law Reports (London), vol. 47 (1974). p. 150). 
110Etat espagnol V. Societe anonyme de I'Hotel Gtorge V (1970) 
(ibid., vol. 52 (Cambridge, 1979), p. 317). 
111 Montefiore V. Congo beige (1955) (ibid., 1955 (London), vol. 22 
(1958), p. 226). 
1J2 Societe immobiliere des Cites /leuries Lafayette v. United States of 
America (1960) (International Law Reports (London), vol. 42 (1971), 
pp. 123-124). 
113 Zavicha Blagojevic V. Banque du Japon (1974) (Annuaire fran-
~ais de droit international, 1975 (Paris), vol. XXI, p. 1040). 
114 Administration des chemins de fer du Gouvernement iranien V. 
Socitte Levant Express Transport (1969) (International Law Reports 
(Cambridge), vol. 52 (1979), p. 315). 
115 Corporacion del Cobre v. Braden Copper Corporation et Societe 
Le groupement d'importation des metaux (1972) and commentary by 
D. Yiannopoulos (see footnote 50 above, in fine). 
116 See , for example, Sir Ian Sinclair, "The law of sovereign 
immunity: Recent developments", Recueil des cours ... 1980--11 
(Alphen aan den Rijn, Si)thoff and Noordhoff, 1981). vol. 167, pp. 
170--175. 
1J7 Heizer V. Kaiser-Franz-Joseph-Bahn A. G. (1885) (Gesetz-und 
Verordnungsblan fur das Konigreich Bayern (Munich). vol. I (1885), 
pp. 15-16), cited in the Harvard draft, op. cit., pp. 533-534. See also 
E. W. Allen, The Position of Foreign States be/ore German Courts 
(New York, Macmillan, 1928). 
118 Bardorf V. Belgische Staats-und Eisenbahnfiskus (1905) (Ent-
scheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen (Leipzig), vol. 62 
(1906), p. 165). 
119Gehrckens V. Jiirnviigsstylrelsen (1925) (Hanseatische Rechts-
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ciDl, industrial or financial fields·"}36 The type of 
p'ractical difficulties encountered by the courts was 
illustrated in the judgment of a more recent case 
decided in 1968,137 where the Court of ~ of The 
Hague reversed the decision of the District Court and 
uptield jurisdiction, holding that the National Iranian 
Oil Company (NIOC) did not perform an act which ex 
jure must be regarded as a pure act of JOvemment. 
71. The exception of trading activities was more 
clearly stated b~ the Hoge Raad (Netherlands Supreme 
Court) in 1973. 38 It was identified with relative ease in 
cases where "a foreigll State engages in trade as an 
ordinary enterprise". The Supreme Court explained 
that the restrictive trend has been induced by the fact 
"that in many States the Government bas increasingly 
deployed its activities in areas of society where the 
relations are governed by private law, and where, 
consequently, the State enters into a leu! relationship 
on an equal footing with individuals" .1!9 
Austria 
72. The practice of Austrian courts has followed a 
~tinct ~gzag path, starting with unqualified immunity 
~ th~ mnet~nth century, an~ changlOg over to restric-
tive unmumty from 1907 unt1l1926, when unrestricted 
immunity was once again revived and followed, until 
1950, when a more solid doctrine of restricted im-
munity was adopted which has been applied with 
consistency ever since. The Supreme Court of Austria, 
in a case decided in 1950,140 reviewed existing authori-
ties ~n ir:tternat!onal la~ before reaching a ~nclusion 
denylOg Immumty, statlOg that "these authonties show 
that the exemption from Itational jurisdiction of acta 
g~tionis of foreign States is no longer generally recog-
ruzed and consequently no longer part of international 
law". The Court went on to say: 
This subjection of the Delli gestionis to the jurisdiction of States has 
its basis in the development of the commercial activity of States. The 
classic doctrine of immunity arose at a time when aU the commercial 
activities of States in foreign countries were connected with their 
political activities ... Today the position is entirely diiferent; States 
~age in commercial activities and . . . enter into competition with 
their own nationals and with foreigners. Ac:cordin&Iy. the classic 
I)6Nederlllndse Rijnbank, Amsterdam v. Miihlig Union, Teplitz-
ScM1UIu (1947) (Na-oorlogse Rechtspraak (Zwollen). vol. 3 (1947), 
No. 990; Annual Digest . .. ,1947 (London), vol. 14 (1951), case No. 
27, p. 78). 
137 N. V. Cabolem v. Nati01Ulilranum Oil Company (1968) (Neder-
ltm4se Jurisprudentie (Zwollen, 1969), No. 484; English trans. in 
UDlted Nations, Materials on Jurisdictio1Ul1 immunities . .. , pp. 344 
et seq.). 
I38Socittt europtenne d'ttudes et d'entreprises en liquidation volon-
laire v. Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1973) (Netherlands 
Yearbook of Inter1ltlti01Ul1 Law, 1974 (Leyden), vol. V, p. 290, 
reproduced in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdicti01Ul1lmmunities 
... , pp. 355 et seq.). 
139 Netherlands Yearbook . .. , p. 293; United Nations, Materials 
. . . , p. 357. See also Voskuil, loc. cit., p. 306 (see footnote 43 above, 
in fine). 
1110 Dralle V. Republic of Czechoslovakia (Osterreichische Juristen 
Zeitung (Vienna), vol. 5 (1950), p. 341, case No. 356; InternaJio"ai 
Law Reports, 1950 (London), vol. 17 (1956), p. 155, case No. 41; 
JO!'r1ItIl du droit internaJi01Uli (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 77 (1950), p. 747); 
this case has become a leading case Cited outside Austria. The text of 
the decision of the Austrian Supreme Court is reproduced in English 
trans. in United Nations, MaJeritlJs 011 JurisdictioMllnuruuUJies. . ., 
pp. 183 et seq. 
doctrine of immunity bas lost its meaning, and, ratione cessanre, can 
DO Joaaer be recopized as a rule of international law .141 
73. The principles enunciated in 1950 have been 
further refined in subsequent decisions of the Supreme 
Court.142 A business undertaking owned by a foreign 
Government was obliged to confonn its activities to 
IocaI regulations. State immunity was not available. 143 
In a case decided in 1961144 the Supreme Court, citing 
practice of States and opiniones doctorum, concluded 
that the distinction between the performance of 
sovereign rilhts by the State and its entry into "a 
private Iegaf relationship" was practical and not too 
difficult to make. "The solution. . . would be to take as 
a criterion not the ultimate purpose of the act but its 
inherent nature. In order for the nature of the act to be 
such as will afford its complete jurisdictional immunity, 
th~ act rr:tus~ '?e one which ~uld not ~ perfonned by a 
private mdlVJdual. "145 It IS the act Itself and not its 
purpose that is decisive of the question of State immun-
Ity. 
United States of America 
74. It has sometimes been said that the practice of the 
courts of the United States of America started with an 
unqualified principle of State immunity. The truth 
might appear to be the op~ite upon closer examina-
tion of the dictum of Chief JUstice Marshall in The 
Schooner "Exchan~e" v. McFaddon and others 
(1812)}46 Initially, Immunities of States were recog-
nized only in respect of certain specified areas: (a) the 
immunity of the sovereigns from arrest and detention; 
(b) the immunity granted to foreign ministers; and (c) 
the immunity in respect of foreign troops passing 
through the territorial dominion. The territorial juris-
diction was exempted as a matter of implied consent on 
the part of the local sovereign, and immunity was 
accordingly considered to be an exception to the attri-
butes of every sovereign power. As such, it should be 
restrictively construed from the point of view of the 
territorial sovereign. The same Chief Justice, in 
another case decided in 1824, supported the soundness 
of the principle "that when a government becomes a 
partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far 
as concerns the transactions of that company, of its 
1410ste"eichische Juristen Zeilung ... , p. 347; and United 
Nations, Materials . ..• p. 195. 
l42See footnotes 144 and 145 below. 
1430ecision of the Administrative Tribunal of 13 January 1954 
(Amtliche Sammlung. No. 869; summary (in English) in Journal du 
~roit in.ter1ltlti01Ul1 (Clunet) (Paris), vol. 83 (1956), p. 86), whereby 
Immu~lIty was refused to a business undertaking owned in Austria by 
a forel$n Government for making and selling alcohol in violation of 
regulations concerning the State hard liquor monopoly. 
1440ecision of the Austrian Supreme Court of 10 February 1961 in 
X (Holubek) V. Government of the United States (Juristische Blatter 
(Vl~:nna), vol. 84 (1962), p. 43; text reproduced in English trans. in 
UDlted Nations. Materials on Jurisdicti01Ulilmmunities ... , pp. 203 
et seq.) . 
14~Extract o! a note 0(23 April 1928 addressed to the League of 
Nation~ by Swlt~erland, CI~d by the Court (Juristische Bliitter: : ., p. 
44; UDlted Nations, Matenals ... , p. 205). See also the deCiSion of 
the Austrian Supreme Court of 14 February 1963 in the case Xv. the 
Gove~~t of the Fednal Republic of Germany (Entscheidun$en des 
Oste"elChtSchen Obenten Gerichtshofin Zivilsachen, 1963 (Vienna), 
vol: XXX~, p. 71, II!0' 26; text reproduced in English trans. 10 
UDlted Nations, Materials . ..• pp. 207-2(9). 




















soverei~ character, and takes that of a private 
citizen' .147 
75. The first emphatic pronouncement of restrictive 
immunity based on the distinction between acts which 
are essentially private in nature and acts which have 
been generally characterized as public or ~overnmental 
was made in 1921 by Judge Julian Mackl48 in a famous 
case concerning the " Pesaro". This distinction was 
supported by the State Department,l49 but was rejected 
by the Supreme Court in 1926,150 revising Judge Mack's 
decision and favouring the view expressed by the 
Department of Justice. 151 The courts in later cases 
preferred to follow the suftestion of the political 
department of government.1S It was not until the Tate 
Letter of 1952 that the official policy of the State 
Department was restated in general and in the clearest 
language in favour of a restrictive theory of immunity 
based upon a distinction between acta imperii and acta 
gestionis, and denying immunity in respect of acta 
gestionis. 
76. Trading activities of a foreign State conducted by 
a trading corporation with separate legal personality 
have been denied sovereign Immunity. Trading cor-
porations owned or controlled by a forei~ Govern-
ment have been held amenable to the junsdiction of 
United States courts regardless of the assertion by the 
foreign Government that they have been performing 
government functions,153 and indeed even Irrespective 
of the court's holding that the foreign corporations 
were performing essentially "public" duties as opposed 
to ordinary commercial operationsl54 that are included 
in the category of activities for which the rule of 
immunity is not applicable. In most cases, such cor-
147 Bank of the United Stiltes v. PlDnters' Bank of Georgia (1824) 
(Wheaton,op. cit., p. 907 (see footnote 64 above»; see also Stilte of 
Georgia v. City of Chattllnooga, Tennessee (1924) (United States 
Reports, vol. 264 (1924), pp. 472, at 482-483, opiruon of the Court 
delivered by Justice Butler). 
I48The "Pesaro" (1921) (United States of America, The Federal 
Reporter, vol. 277 (1922), pp. 473, at 479-480, footnote 3); see also 
E. D. Dickinson, "The immunity of public ships employed in trade", 
The American Jou17Ull of InternationiU Law (Washington, D.C.), vol. 
21 (January 1927), p. 108. 
149Letter of 2 August 1921 from Mr. Nielsen, Solicitor for the 
Department of State, to Judge Julian W. Mack (see G. H. Hack-
worth, Digest of International Law (Washington, D.C.), U.S. Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1941, vol. II, pp. 438-439). . 
I50Berizzi Brothers Co. v. S.S. "Pesaro" (1926) (United Stiltes 
Reports, vol. 271 (1927), p. 562). 
151 See, for example, the letter of Attorney General Gregory of 25 
November 1918, refusing to adopt Secretary of State Lansing's 
suggestion in his letter of 8 November 1918 (Hackworth, op. cit., vol. 
II, p. 430). 
1S2See Chief Justice Stone in Republic of Mexico et aI. v. Hoffman 
(1945): 
"It is therefore not for the courts to deny an immunity which our 
government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new 
~unds which the government has not seen fit to recognize." 
(United Sillies Reports, vol. 324 (1946), p. 35.) 
153 See , for example, Coale et aI. v. Societe cooperative suisse 
des charbons, Basle et al. (1921) (Annual Digest . .. , 1919-1922 
(London), vol. 1 (1932), case No. 88, p. 133); Dexter & Carpenter, 
Inc. v. Kung.Jig Jamviigsstylrelsen et al. (1930) (Annual Digest . .. , 
1929-1930 (London), vol. 5 (1935), case No. 70, p. 109); United 
Sillies v. DtulSches kaiisyndiJclll Gesellschaft et al. (1929) (ibid., case 
No. 71, p. 110). 
IS4See, for example, Hannes v. Kingdom of Romania Monopolies 
Instilule (1940) (Annual Digest ... , 193frl940 (I:ondon), _ vol. 9 
(1942), case No. 72, pp. 198 et seq.); and CompanJa EspanolD de 
Navegacwn, MarllimD, S.A. v. The "Navnnar" et aI. (1938) (United 
Sillies Reports, vol. 303 (1938), p. 68). 
219 
porations not identified as agents, organs or in-
strumentalities of government have been engaged in 
trading activities. Immunity has been refused, regard-
less of the extent of government interest in the trading 
corporations. 155 
n. An interesting trend was initiated in a more recent 
case decided in 1964,156 where the Federal District 
Court rejected immunity in an action arising out of a 
contract for the carriage of wheat. According to this 
trend, the courts are disposed to deny immunity unless 
it is plain that the activity in question falls within one of 
the following categories of strictly political and public 
acts: (a) internal administrative acts, such as e~ulsion 
of aliens; (b) legislative acts, such as nationalIzation; 
(c) acts concernin$ the armed forces; (d) acts concern-
ing diplomatic activity; (e) public loans.1~7 
78. Since the adoption of the Foreign Immunities Act 
of 1976,158 the courts have been left on their own 
without specific guidance or suggestion of immunity in 
a particular case from the State department. Pre-1976 
judicial practice has thus been to a greater or lesser 
extent influenced by the "views" or "suggestion" of the 
executive branch of the government, especially if it is 
one favourable to the granting of immunity.l59 Even 
before the 1976 Act, the courts had to determine the 
question of State immunity raised by the parties to the 
dispute without any guidance or "suggestion" from the 
executive. In such cases,l60 the courts have faithfully 
followed the guidelines set out in the Tate Letter and 
subsequent case-law. 
79. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 
provides legislative guidance for the courts with regard 
to the application of the exception of commercial 
activity carried on in the United States, or an act 
performed in the United States in connection with a 
commercial activity elsewhere, or an act outside the 
territory of the United States in connection with a 
commercial activity, causing a direct effect in the 
United States. "Commercial activity" is defined as 
either a regular course of conduct or a particular 
155 See, for example, United Sillies v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat 
Gesellschaft et aI. (1929)(see footnote 153 above); and Ulen de Co. v. 
Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (1940) (Annual Digest . ... , 193fr 
194() (op. cit.), case No. 74, p. 214). 
156 Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisario General de Abastecimientos 
y Transporlts (1964) (United States of America, Federal Reporter, 2nd 
Series, vol. 336 (1965), p. 354; International Law Reports (London), vol. 
35 (967), p. 110). 
1S7Cf. the categories proposed by H. Lauterpacht, "The problem 
of jurisdictional immunities of foreign States", The British Year Book 
of International Law, 1951 (London), vol. 28, pp. 236-238; and J. F. 
Lalive, "L'immunite de juridiction des Etats et des organisations 
internationales", Recutil des cours ... , 1953-1lI (Leyden, Sijthoff, 
1955), vol. 84, pp. 28~286). 
158 United Sillies Code, 1976 Edition, vol. 8, title 28, sect. 97, p. 206 
(text reproduced in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional 
Immunities . . ., pp. 5S et seq.). 
IS9ChemicaI Natural Resources v. Republic of VenezutlD (1966) 
(/ntmlational Law Rtports (London), vol. 42 (1971), p. 119); 
Isbrandtsen Tankers v. President of India (1970) (International Legal 
Matoiols (Washington, D.C.), vol. X, No.5 (September 1971), p. 
1(46); Amior Corporation v. Bank of Korea (1969) (Internatiotial 
Law Reports (Cambridge), vol. 53 (1919), p. 291). 
160 See , for example, Heaney v. Government of Spain and Gomero 
(1971) (/nterruJlionai Legal Materials (Washin~on, D.C.), vol. X, 
No.5 (September 1971), p. 1038), where publicity was held to be a 
"strictly political or public act" (p. 1042); Alfred Dunhill of London, 
Inc. v. Republic of Cuba (1976) (ibid., vol. XV, No.4 (July 1976), p. 
735). where four Justices of the United States Supreme Court noted: 
"In their commercial capacities, foreign governments do not exercise 
powers peculiar to sovereigns." (pp. 7~747). 
commercial transaction or act. The commercial charac-
ter of an activity is determined by reference to the 
nature of the course of conduct or {'articular transac-
tion, rather than by reference to Its purpose. Sub-
sequent litigations amply illustrate the difficulties 
inherent in the application of this exception of "trading 
activity", especially in borderline cases. 161 
United Kingdom 
SO. In view of the recent reversal of a long line of 
cases allowing State immunity even in res{>Cct of trad-
ing activity of a foreign Government, it IS no longer 
fashionable to state that British courts have consistently 
upheld jurisdictional immunity in any circumstance. In 
actual fact, British practice can now be said to have 
adopted a restrictive theory of immunity, particularly in 
respect of "commercial transactions" and "contracts to 
be performed in the United Kin~dom" or "an indust-
rial, commercial or financial activity". In connection 
with commercial activities of foreign States, notably in 
the field of shipping or maritime transport, the case-law 
fluctuated throughout the nineteenth century .162 The 
decision that went furthest in the direction of restriction 
was The "Charkieh" (1873),163 and in the opposite 
direction was The "Porto Alexandre" (1920).164 The 
principle of unqualified immunity was applied in subse-
quent cases in respect of commercial shippin~ in 1924165 
and other trading activities, such as the ordmary com-
mercial sale of a quantity of rye in 1957.166 
81. Long before the final coup de grace given by the 
House of Lords in the "/ Congreso del Partido" case 
(1981),167 judicial decisions of British courts abounded 
with opinions and dicta pronounced by members of the 
courts at all levels. Even in the House of Lords in The 
"Cristina" case (1938),168 considerable doubts were 
161 See, for example, IntenuuiofUll Association of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers v. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (1979) (United States of America, Federal Supplement, 
vol. 477 (1979), p. 553; reproduced in United Nations, Materials on 
JurisdictiofUlllmmunities . .. , pp. 503 et seq.); and cases compiled by 
the State Department: Libyan American Oil Company v. Socialist 
People's Libyan Arab Jamahirira (1980) (see footnote 28 above), 
utelier v. Republic of Chile (1980) (United States of America, 
Federal Supplement, vol. 488 (1980), p. 665), New England Mer-
chants NatiofUll Bank v. Iran Power Generation and Transmission 
Co. et al. (1980) (ibid., vol. 495 (1981), p. 73). 
162See Sucharitkul, State Immunities and Trading Activities . .. 
(op. cit., footnote 105 above), pp. 53-71. 
163See footnote 59 above; compare Sir Robert Phillimore's judg-
ment in The "Parlement beige" case (1879) (see footnote 60 above). 
164United Kingdom, The Law Reports, Probate Division, 1920, p. 
30. 
165Compania Mercantil Argentina v. United States Shipping Board 
(1924) (Annual Digest . .. , 1923-1924 (London), vol. 2 (1933), case 
No. 73, p. 138). 
.166Baccus S. R. L. v. Servicio Nacional del Trigo (1956) (United 
Kingdom, The Law Reports, Queen's Bench Division, 1957, vol. 1, 
p.438). 
~67 The All England Law Reports, 1981, vol. 2, p. 1064 (Lord 
~I1berforce, Lord Diplock, Lord Edmund-Davies, Lord Keith of 
Kinkel, Lord Bridge of Harwich); see also the decision of the Court 
of Appeal in 1980 (Lord Denning and Lord Waller) (ibid., vol. I, 
p. 1092). . 
168United Kingdom, The Law Reports, House of Lords, Judicial 
Comminee of the Privy Council, 1938, p. 485; Annual Digest . .. 
1938-1940 (London), vol. 9 (1942) case No. 86, p. 250. See H. 
Lauterpacht, "The CristifUl", The Law Quarterly Review (London), 
vol. LIV (1938), p. 339: F. A. Mann, "Immunity of foreign States", 
The !oIodem Law Review (London), vol. II (1938), p. 57; R. Y. 
Jenrungs, "Recognition and government immunities", ibid., vol. II 
(1939), p. 288. 
thrown upon the soundness of the doctrine of immunity 
when ap{'lied to trading vessels. While Lord Atkin and 
Lord Wnghtl69 favoured an unrestricted rule of immun-
ity, Lord Thankertonl70 and Lord.Maugham declared 
themselves free to reconsider the decision in The 
"Porto Alexandre". Lord Mau~am was prepared to 
subject The "Cristina" to the Jurisdiction of English 
courts, had she been a vessel employed by the Spanish 
Government in commercial voyages, and stated that "if 
The Parlement Beige had been used solely for trading 
pu~ses, the decision would have been the other way 
. _ . '. Lord Maugham concluded that there was prac-
tical unanimity of opinion "that, if Governments or 
corporations formed by them choose to navigate or 
trade as shipowners, they ought to submit to the same 
legal remedies and actions as any ship owner". 171 
82. Lord Maugham's misgivings about the decisions 
of The "Porto Alexandre" case (1920) have been widely 
quoted and followed in common-law countries outside 
the United Kingdom.172 In Dollfus Mieg et Cie S.A. v. 
Bank of England (1950),173 Sir Raymond Evershed M. R. 
agreed with Lord Maugham that "extent of the rule of 
immunity should be jealously watched" .174 On further 
appeal to the House of Lords in 1952, three out of four 
Law Lords concurred in the observation of Lord 
Maugham that the doctrine of immunity should not be 
extended. 17S Viscount Simon is another exponent of a 
restrictive theory of immunity. In Sultan of lohore v. 
Abubakar, Tunku Aris Bendahara and others (1952), 
Lord Simon in the Privy Council gave an opinion per 
curiam denying "that there has been finally established 
in England . . _ any absolute rule that a foreign inde-
pendent sovereign cannot be impleaded in our courts in 
any circumstances" .176 Another proponent of restric-
tive immunity is Lord Denning, who after a search 
among the accepted sources of international law con-
cluded that there was no uniform rule in Rahimtoola v. 
Nizam of Hyderabad (1957),177 where he observed: 
... If the dispute brings into question, for instance, the legislative 
or international transactions of a foreign government, or the policy of 
its executive, the court should grant immunity if asked to do so, 
because it does offend the dignity of a foreign sovereign to have such 
a dispute canvassed in the domestic court of another country but if 
the dispute concerns, for instance, the commercial transactions of the 
foreign Government (whether carried on by its own departments or 
agencies or by setting up separate legal entities), and it arises 
properly within the territorial ~urisdiction of our courts, there is DO 
ground for granting immunity. 78 
169United Kingdom, The Law Reports, House of Lords . .. , 1938, 
pp. 490 and 512, respectively. 
170 Ibid., pp. 494-496; see also the opinion of Lord Macmillan, 
p.498. 
171 Ibid., pp. 519 and 522. 
172See, for example, The "Ramava" (1941) (Annual Digest . .. , 
1941-1942 (London), vol. 10 (1945), case No. 20, p. 91). In this Irish 
case, immunity was denied, Justice Hanna having thought that the 
decision of Sir Robert Phillimore in The "Charkieh" (1873) (see 
footnote 59 above) was never overruled. 
173 United Kingdom, The Law Reports, Chancery Division, 1950, p. 
333. 
174 Ibid. , p. 356. 
175 United States of America and Republic of France v. Dol/Jus Mieg 
et Cie S.A. and Bank of England (1952) (The All England Law 
Reports, 1952, vol. 1, p. 572). 
J76Ibid., p. 1261, opinion of the Council at p. 1268; see also The 
Law Quarterly Review (London), vol. 68 (1952), p. 293. 
177United Kingdom, The Law Reports, Housl! of Lords, 1958, p. 
379. 
178lbid., p. 422. 
83. Lord Denning reiterated his restrictive theory in 
Thai-Europe Tapioca Service Ltd. v. Government of 
Pakistan, Ministry of Food and A~riculture, Directorate 
of Agricultural Supplies (1975).179 Apart from consent, 
he outlined four exceptions: 
First, (there is] no immunity in respect of land situate in England. 
Second . . . in respect of trust funds here or money lodged for the 
payment of creditors. '.' . 
Third . . . in respect of debts incurred here for services rendered to 
... property here .... 
Fourth, (when] a foreign sovereign ... enters into a commercial 
transaction- with a trader here and a dispute arises which is 
properly within the territorial jurisdiction of (English] courts. 1M! 
84. Lord Denning's dicta and observations have been 
very well received outside the United Kingdom.un 
Finally, a forerunner of the ultimate reversal came with 
the decision of the Privy Council in the "Philippine 
Admirar' case in 1975. 182 The Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council, for the first time, refused to follow 
the Court of Appeal in The "Porto Alexandre" case, 
and gave the following weighty reasons: 
... In the first place, the Court decided the case as it did because 
its members thought they were bound to so decide by The Parlement 
Beige, whereas-as their Lordships think-the decision in The Parle-
ment Beige did not cover the case at all. Secondly, although Lord 
Atkin and Lord Wright approved the decision in The Porto Alexan-
dre, the other three Law Lords who took part in The Cristina case 
thought it was at least doubtful whether sovereign immunity should 
extend to state-owned vessels engaged in ordinary commerce. 
Moreover this Board in the case of The Sultan of lohore made it clear 
that it considered that the question was an open one. Thirdly, the 
trend of opinion in the world outside the Commonwealth since the 
last war has been increasingly against the application of the doctrine 
of sovereign immunity to ordinary trading transactions. Lastly, their 
Lordships themselves think that it is wrong that they should be so 
applied. 183 
85. In 1977, the Court of Appeal in Trendtex Trading 
Corporation Ltd. v. The Central Bank of Nigeria 184 held 
unanimously that the Central Bank was a separate 
entity and, by a majority of two to one, that the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity no longer applied to 
ordinary trading transactions and that the restrictive 
doctrine should be applied to actions in personam as 
well as actions in rem. ISS This emeq~ing trend away 
from unlimited immunity culminated 10 the long-over-
179 The AU England Low Reports, 1975, vol. 3, p. 961. 
1M!lbid., pp. 965-966. See also the Supreme Court of Ontario in 
Harold W. M. Smith v. United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission (1976) (International Legal Materials (Washington, 
D.C.), vol. XV, No.2 (March 1976), p. 319 and particularly pp. 
323-j24). 
181See , for example, the opinion of Justice Owen in the Court of 
Appeal of Quebec in Venne v. Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(1969) (Canada, The Dominion Low Reports, Third Series (Toronto), 
vol. 5 (1969), p. 128): an action to recover fees for services provided 
in designing a pavilion at Exp0-67 was allowed to proceed. 
1820wners of the ship "Philippine Admiraf' v. Wallem Shipping 
(Hong Kong), Ltd. (1975) (The All England Low Reports, 1976, vol. 
1, p. 78). 
183lbid., p. 95. 
IB4See footnote 55 above. The Trendtcx case was settled before it 
reached the House of Lords, so that many issues remained un-
resolved. The case Uganda Co. (Holdings) Ltd. v. Government of 
Uganda (1978) (Uoyd's Low Reports, 1979 (London), vol. 1, p. 481) 
illustrates one such unsatisfactory result. 
111SSee the difference between the incorporation theory and the 
transfomtation theory of intemationallaw as part of English law. See 
also A. O. Adede, "The United Kingdom abandons the doctrine of 
absolute sovereign immunity", Brooklyn Journal of International 
Low, vol. VI, No.2 (1980), p. 197. 
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due decision of the House of Lords in the" I Congreso 
del Partido" (l981)}86 Apart from the interesting 
peculiarities and niceties of English Admiralty rules ana 
procedures such as sister ship jurisdiction, which will be 
examined in a separate connection,l87 this decision of 
the House of Lords put an end to some of the doubts 
and hesitations on matters of principle. Reinforced by 
the State Immunity Act 1978,188 the judicial practice of 
British courts must now be said to be well settled in 
relation to the exception of trading activities of foreign 
Governments. 
86. Althou~ the law or judicial practice may have 
been settled 10 principle with regard to the exception of 
trading activity, the courts are still confronted in each 
case with the task of determinin$ whether the element 
of governmental authority exerCIsed in relation to the 
set of facts involved is such as to render the activity in 
question governmental and non-commercial. The 
courts still have to decide in a particular case whether in 
the application of the restnctive rule to follow an 
objective test of the "nature of the transaction" or the 
more subjective test of "public purpose" or the com-
bination of both, or indeed the more formal test of 
"legislative intervention" by the foreign Government. 
87. The dramatic change in the judicial practice of the 
United Kingdom as a principal common-law system is 
apt to produce changes in other common-law jurisdic-
tions, especially within the Commonwealth of Nations. 
Such changes may take time to materialize. In 
Australial89 and New Zealand, the repercussions of the 
English decision in the "I Congreso del Partido" case 
will be felt. Recently the Canadian case-Iawl90 has 
tended to follow the examples set by the United 
Kingdom and the United States191 by adopting 
appropriate legislation to assist the courts to ensure a 
practice that will be more harmonious and consistent 
with the current trend. l92 Likewise, recent develop-
ments in the case-law of India deserve a close 
examination. 193 
Pakistan 
88. Pakistan and India share a similar Code of Civil 
Procedure-section 86, paragraph 1 of which provides 
that: 
186See footnote 167 above; see the judgment pronounced by Lord 
Wilberforce (loc. cit., pp. lO6(r.l078), Lord Edmund-Davies concur-
ring in favour of dismissing the appeal in the "Marble Islands" case 
(pp. 1~1082), and dissenting opinions of Lord Diplock (pp. 
1078-1080), on the one hand, and of Lord Keith and Lord Bridge 
(pp. 1082-1083), on the other, both in favour of allowing the appeal. 
187Immunities of public vessels or State-owned ships employed in 
commerce will be considered under a separate heading. 
188United Kingdom, The Public General Acts, 1978, part 1, chap. 
33, p. 715 (reproduced in United Nations, Materials on lurisdictit?nal 
Immunities Of States . .. , pp. 41 et seq.); see the reply ofthe Umted 
Kingdom to question 3 of the questionnaire sent to Governments in 
1979 (United Nations, Materials . .. , pp. 621-622). See also F. A. 
Mann, "The State Immunity Act 1978", The British Year Book of 
International Low, 1978 (London), vol. 49, p. 43. 
189 See , for example, Sinclair, loco cit., pp. 190-192 (see footnote 
116 above). . 
190 Ibid., pp. 192-193. 
191 See the United Kingdom State Immunity Act 1978 (see footnote 
188 above) and the United States of America Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act of 1976 (see footnote 158 above). 
I92See footnote 221 below. 
I93 See, for example. Sinclair, loco cit., pp. 194-195. 
No rulers of a foreign State may be sued in 1liiy court otherwise 
competent to try the suit except with the consent of the Central 
Government in writing by a Secretary to that Government. l94 
The courts in Pakistan, like those in India 19S had 
occasions to consider the relationship betw~n this 
provision and general international law. In 1971 the 
Court of Karachi was not inclined to follow the ru1~s of 
interpretation adopted by En2lish courts, but rather to 
have recourse to prevalent religious and spiritual stan-
dards in interpre~in.g and enforcing laws. l96 It was 
regarded as penmssible and not uncommon, even in 
secular Stat<:s, to !ill the gaps .in international law by 
normal considerations and taking recourse to Islamic 
law. 
89. The Supreme Court of Pakistan in a breath-
taking decision in A. M. Qureshi v. Union of Soviet 
Socia/~t Republics and another (1981),197 took occasion 
!o ~e~e~ and survey the laws and practice of other 
Junsdlctlons as well as relevant international conven-
tions and opir~i~ns .of writers, and confirming with 
approval the dlstmchon between acta jure imperii and 
acta jure gestionis, held that the courts of Pakistan had 
jurisdiction in respect of commercial acts of a foreign 
Government. It was observed in conclusion by Justice 
Kar~m Elahee Chauhan (with four other judges con-
cumng): 
The upshot, in my view, of this discussion is that: 
(1) Section 86 of the Civil Procedure Code does not bar the suit 
filed by .tie appellant against the respondents; 
(~) That there is no positive rule of Customary International [law) 
which.can be pleaded as a bar of jurisdiction to the maintainability of 
the SUIt. On the other hand, the rule of International Law followed by 
most States at present and which rule, in my view, should be followed 
by the Courts of Pakistan is that acts of a commercial nature are not 
immune from the jurisdiction of the Municipal Courts. Therefore, 
the plaintiff's suit was maintainable and the decision to dismiss it as 
incompetent is erroneous and deserves to be set aside. l98 
Argentina 
90. An examination of the case-law of Argentina 
reveals a trend in favour of a restrictive doctrine of 
State immunity. The courts recognized and applied the 
principle of sovereign immunity in various cases with 
regard to sovereign acts of a foreign Government. l99 
The exception of trading activity was confirmed in The 
1941ndia, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, The Code 
of Civil Procedure, 1908 (as modified up to 1 May 1977), p. 32; 
Pakistan, Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs, The Pakistan 
Code (Karachi), vol. V (190S-1910), p. 53. 
I9SSee , for example, Kashani v. United Arab Republic (1965) (The 
Indian Journal of International Law (New Delhi), vol. 6 (1966), p. 51; 
The American Journal of International Law (Washington, D.t.), vol. 
60 (1966), p. 861); see also Sinclair, loc. cit., p. 194. 
196 The Secretary of State of the United States of America V. Messrs. 
Gammon-Layton (1971) (All Pakistan Legal Decisions (Lahore), vol. 
XXIII (1971), p. 314). 
197 Ibid. , vol. XXXIII (1981), p. 377. 
• 198 Ibid. , p. 453. 
199 See , for example, Baima y Bessolina V. Gobiemo del Paraguay 
(l91~) (Argentina,. Fa/los de ID Corte Suprema de Justicia de ID 
Nadon (Buenos AIres), vol. 123, p. 58); United Stales Shipping 
·Board V. Dodero Hermanos (1924) (ibid., vol. 141, p. 127)' IIIId 
Zubiau"e v: Gobierno de Bolivia (1899) (ibid., vol. 79, p. 124)'; also 
~ocl!mentatl0!l submitt~d by Argentina concerning its national leg-
Islation (English trans. ID United Nations, MaterialS on Jurisdictional 
Immunities . .. , pp. 3-4) and the decisions of national courts (ibid., 
pp. 7~74). 
UAguila''1OO in respect of a contract of sale to be 
performed and complied with within the jurisdictional 
limits of the Argentine Republic. The court declared 
itself competent and ordered the case to proceed on the 
grounds "that the intrinsic validity of thiS contract and 
aU matters relating to it should be regulated in accord-
ance with the general laws of the Nation and that the 
national courts are competent in such matters" .:2111 
Chile 
91. The case-law of Chile appears to have firmly 
recognized the princi{>le of sovereign immunity without 
drawing any distinction between the various acts or 
activities of a foreign State. Recent decisions have 
confirmed a uniform doctrine on broad and practically 
unrestricted recognition of the jurisdictional immuni-
ties of foreign States.2m The Supreme Court of Justice 
in 1975 annulled the final judgment of 16 January 1969 
rendered by the Fifth Santiago Superior Departmental 
Court in A. Senerman v. Republic of Cuba, on the 
~ound that ". . . in regulating the junsdictional activ-
!ty of different Stat~s the .limit im~sed on this activity, 
m regard to the subjects, IS that which determines that a 
sovereign State must not be subject to the jurisdictional 
power of the courts of another State".203 There has 
been no decision directly on the J?Ossibility of an 
exception in respect of trading activities. 
Philippines 
92. The Supreme Court of the Philippines has had 
several occasions to consider and give judgments on 
various general aspects of State immunitles. However, 
the question directly in point, namely the possible 
exception of tradin~ctivity, has not yet come before 
the Supreme Court. 
(b) Governmental practice 
93. An examination of the governmental practice of 
States in regard to the application of State Immunities 
~d ~ading activities should cover several aspects, 
mcludmg the role played by the executive in influencing 
judicial decisions, and the views of the Governments on 
the su~je~ and n?t only i~ connection with a plea of 
sovereign Immumty submitted by a foreign Govern-
ment, but also the extent to which a State is prepared to 
forego the privilege of sovereign immunity and to 
21XJ M~istro Plenipotenciario de Chile V. Fratelli Lavarello (1892) 
(ArgentlDa, Fa/los de ID Corte Suprema de Justicia de fa Nadon 
(Buenos Aires), vol. 47, p. 248). 
201 Extract of the decision in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdic-
tional Immunities . .. , p. 73; see also I. Ruiz Moreno, EI Derecho 
Internadonal Publico ante la Corte Suprema (Editorial Universitaria 
de Buenos Aires, 1941). 
~Three of the four cases cited in the documentation submitted by 
Chtle (United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional Immunities . .. , 
pp. ~251) concerned the years 1968 and 1969 and, respectively, a 
labour dispute and preventive injunctions. 
203This decision of the Supreme Coun of 2 June 1975 is more 
di~ectly in point; it establishes a doctrine of sovereifn immunity 
WIthout delimiting its scope of application (ibid., p. 25 ). Similarly, 
~raziI's reply to question 3 of the questionnaire sent to Governments 
m 1979 states that "Brazilian couns consider the doctrine of immun-
ity of States as absolute" (ibid., p. 562) but does not give any 
reference to a specific decision. 
204See an interesting survey of decisions of the Philippines Sup-
reme Coun (ibid., pp. 360 et seq.). 
conclude such agreements in the form of bilateral or 
multilateral treaties. 
(i) The role of the executive 
94. Within a given jurisdiction, the political branch of 
the Government or the executive as represented by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Justice 
could have a part to play in the determination of 
questions of junsdictional immunities of foreign States. 
The practice is well-known, for instance, in the United 
States, of "views" or "suggestions" given to the trial 
courts in particular instances. Whether or not and to 
what extent the "views" or "suggestions" of the execu-
tive will be followed in each case depends ultimately on 
the court itself. In the United States, the "Tate Letter" 
of 1952205 may be considered a classic example of a 
general policy or guidelines given by the Government 
for the jUdiciary. After reviewing comparative case-
law, the "Tate Letter" clearly indicated the intention of 
the Government "to follow the restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity in the consideration of requests of 
foreign ~overnments for a grant of sovereign 
immunity' .206 
95. Quite apart from the declaration of a policy or 
guidelines in general such as the "Tate Letter" and 
specific "views" or "suggestions of immunity" given in 
particular cases, the executive· could bring about 
changes in legal decisions by introducing new rules in 
the form of legislation. As will be seen, this has been 
done in the United States of America in 1976, the 
United Kingdom in 1978, Pakistan in 1981, and is being 
done in Canada, and contemplated in Singapore and 
Barbados. 
(ii) Views of Governments 
96. The views of Governments on the topic can be 
deduced from the prevailing internal laws on the sub-
ject. In the absence of specific legislation, they could be 
expressed either in a particular case or as a general 
policy and guidelines as in the Tate Letter. The gov-
ernmental practice as evidenced by the views of the 
executive can be found sometimes in the form of 
advices and legal opinions, such as is the practice in the 
United Kingdom,207 the Federal Republic of 
205Letter of 19 May 1952 to Acting Attorney General Perlman 
from the Acting Legal Adviser of the Department of State. J. B. Tate 
(United States of America. The Department of State Bulletin 
(Washington. D.C.). vol. XXVI. No. 678 (23 June 1952). pp. 
984-985). See also W. W. Bishop. Jr.. "New United States policy 
limiting sovereign immunity". The American Journal of Internlllional 
Law (Washington. D.C.). vol. 47 (1953). p. 93; and L. M. Draschler. 
"Some observations on the current status of the Tate Letter". ibid .• 
vol. 54 (1960). p. 790. 
lIIf'See Sinclair. loco cit .• pp. 161-162; Sucharitkul. Recueil des 
coun . .. , 1976-1, pp. 158--161 (see footnote 38 above. in fine). See 
the cases Uniled States of Mexico et al. v. Schmuck ~ al. (1943) 
(Annual Digest . .. , 1943-1945 (London), vol. 12 (1949). case No. 
21, p. 75); Ex parte R~UbliC of Peru (1943) (United States Reports. 
vol. 318 (1943). p. 578 ; The "Katingo Hadjipalera" (1941) (United 
States of America. Fe ral Supplement. vol. 40 (1942). pp. 546-548; 
on appeal. Federal Reporter. Second Series. vol. 119 (1941). p. 1022; 
certoriori denied. United States Reports. vol. 313 (1941). p. 593); 
Republic of Mexico etal. V. Hoffman (1945) (see footnote 152 above); 
The "Martin Behrman" (1947) (Annual Digest . .. , 1947. vol. 14 
(1951), case No. 26. p. 75); and Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisario 
General de Abastecimientos y Transportes (1964) (see footnote 156 
above). 
317 See. for example, Lord McNair. Internlllional lAw Opinions 
(Cambridge University Press. 1956). vol. I. p. 71. 
Germany208 and other countries. Source materials are 
not readily available except in the official files of the 
ministries of foreign affairs or of justice or the Attorney 
General's office. They are to be found also in the 
materials submitted by Member Governments as well 
as in replies to the questionnaire on specific questions. 
For instance, the Governments of Czechoslovakia,209 
the German Democratic Republic210 and Poland2l1 
have expressed their views favouring an unrestricted 
theory of immunity in preference to a distinction being 
made between acta jure imperii and acta jure gestionis, 
which is not always workable. 
97. While the views of Governments on a particular 
question of international law clearly have a bearing on 
legal developments, they do not as such afford evidence 
of customary rules of international law, save to the 
extent that they have been incorporated in judicial 
decisions or legislation, or indeed, treaty provisions. 
None the less, tbe wishes of Governments are material 
and should be taken into consideration. They are 
certainly relevant in relation to the possibility of im-
plied waiver or implied consent, and could be con-
ditioned by differing results due to the application of 
the principle of reciprocity. Reciprocity appears to 
operate to limit or restrict immunity, rather than 
extend its application, in the wake of increasing tenden-
cies to deny State immunity in several identified areas 
of activities such as trading. 
(iii) Treaty practice 
98. The attitude or views of a Government can be 
gathered from its established treaty practice. Bilateral 
treaties may contain provisions whereby parties agree 
in advjlnce to submit to the jurisdiction of the local 
courts in respect of certain specified areas of activities 
such as trading. Thus, the treaty practice of the Soviet 
Union amply demonstrates its willingness to have the 
commercial relations carried on by separate enterprises 
or trading organizations regulated by competent ter-
ritorial authorities.212 While the fact that a State is 
consistent in its practice in this particular regard may be 
considered as proof of the absence of rules of inter-
national law on the subject, or the permissiveness 
of deviation or derogation from such rules through 
bilateral agreements, an accumulation of such bilateral 
treaty practices could combine to corroborate the evi-
dence of existence of a general practice of States in 
support of the limitations agreed upon, which could 
ripen into accepted exceptions in international practice. 
This view was substantiated by a member of the 
-See, for example, the note of 24 August 1964 addressed to the 
Am~assador of Colombia in the Fede~al Republic of Germany by the 
Acting Legal Counsel of the ColombIan GOvernment. Mr. H. Ruiz 
Varela (English trans. in United Nations. Materials on Jurisdictional 
Immunities . ..• I'P. 79 et seq.); and the note of 7 August 1979 to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations from the Charge d'affaires 
of the Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany (see 
footnote 128 above). . 
2119United Nations. Materiols Oil Jurisdictional Immunities ...• pp. 
82-83. 
210 Ibid. , pp. 84-85. 
211lbid .• pp. 90-91. 
212See footnote 214 below for a list of treaties between socialist 
countries containing provisions on jurisdictional immunities of 
States. 
Commission regarding the practice of his own 
country. 213 
99. An example typical of the provisions contained in 
a series of treaties concluded by the Soviet Union with 
socialist countries is furnished by the Treaty of Trade 
and Navigation with the People's Republic of China, 
signed at Peking on 23 April 1958.214 With regard to the 
legal status of the Trade Delegation of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics in China and the Chinese 
Trade Delegation in the Soviet Union, article 4 of the 
annex provides: 
The Trade Delegation shall enjoy all the immunities to which a 
sovereign State is entitled and which relate also to foreign trade, with 
the following exceptions only, to which the Parties agree: 
(a) Disputes regarding foreign commercilll contracts· concluded or 
guaranteed under article 3 by the Trade Delegation in the territory of 
the receiving State shall, in the absence of a reservation regarding 
arbitration or any other jurisdiction, be subject to the competence of 
the courts of the said State. No interim court orders for the provision 
of security may be made; 
(b) Final judicial decisions against the Trade Delegation in the 
aforementioned disputes which have become legally valid may be 
enforced by execution, but such execution may be levied only on the 
goods and claims outstanding to the credit of the Trade Delegation. 
100. A comparable provision of article 10 of the 
Agreement with France of 1951,215 typical of treaties 
concluded between the Soviet Union and developed 
countries, reads: 
The Trade Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
in France shall enjoy the privileges and immunities arising out of 
article 6 above, with the following exceptions: 
Disputes regarding commercilll transactions· concluded or guaran-
teed in the territory of France by the Trade Delegation of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics under the first paragraph of article 8 of 
this Agreement shall, in the absence of a reservation regarding 
arbitration or any other jurisdiction, be subject to the competence of 
the French courts and be settled in accordance with French raw, save 
as otherwise provided by the terms of individual contracts or by 
French legislation. 
No interim orders may, however, be made against the Trade 
Delegation. 
101. Another set of treaties concluded by the Soviet 
21lSee the statement by Mr. Tsuruoka during the thirty-third 
session of the Commission in which he referred to the trade treaties 
concluded by Japan with the United States in 1953 and with the 
USSR in 1957 (Yearbook . .. 1981, vol. I, p. 63, 1654th meeting, 
para. 23). 
21'United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 313, p. 135. Cf. treaties 
signed by the USSR with Romania (1947) (ibid., vol. 226, p. 79); 
Hungary (1947) (ibid., vol. 216, p. 247); Czechoslovakia (1947) 
(ibid., vol. 217, p. 35); Bulgaria (1948) (ibid., p. 97); the German 
Democratic Republic (1957) (ibid., vol. 292, p. 75); Mongolia (1957) 
(ibid., vol. 687, p. 237); Albania (1958) (ibid., vol. 313, P: 261); Vi~t 
Nam (1958) (ibid., vol. 356,]. 149); the Democratlc People. s 
Republic of Korea (1960) (ib· ., vol. 399, p. 3); ~~echoslovakla 
(1973) (ibid., vol. 904, p. 17). The relevant provlSlons of these 
treaties are reproduced in English in United Nations, Materials on 
Jurisdictional Immunities ... , pp. 134-139. 
215 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 221, p. 95. See, for example, 
the case Societe Ie Gostorg et Representation commerciale de /,URSS 
v. Association France-Export (1926) (see footnote 106 above). Cf. 
similar provisions in treaties concluded by the USSR with Denmark 
{
1946) (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 8, p. 201); Finland (1947) 
ibid., vol. 217, p. 3 ; Italy (1948 (ibid., p. 181); Austria (1955) 
ibid., vol. 240, p. 2iJ); Japan (l95~) (ibid., vol. 325, p. 35); Federal 
Republic of Germany (1958) (ibid., vol. 346, p. 71); the Netherlands 
(1971) (Traclalenblad van hetKoninkrijk der Nederlanden (The 
Hague, 1971), No. 163). The relevant proviSions of these treaties are 
reproduced in English in United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictional 
Immunities . .. , pp. 140-144. 
Union with developing countries also contain provi-
sions recognizing the exception of commercial transac-
tions. Thus, paragraph 3 of the exchange of letters of 2 
December 1953 concerning the Trade Agreement be-
tween the Soviet Union and India216 reads: 
It was agreed that the commercial transactions entered into or 
guaranteed in India by the members of the Trade Representations 
including those stationed in New Delhi shall be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of India and the laws thereof unless 
otherwise provided by agreement between the contracting parties to 
the said transactions. Only the goods, debt demands and other assets 
of the Trade Representation directly relating to the commercial 
transactions concluded or guaranteed by the Trade Representation 
IbaI1 be liable in execution of decrees and orders passed in respect of 
such transactions. It was understood that the Trade Representation 
will not be responsible for any transactions concluded by other Soviet 
organizations direct, without the Trade Representation's guarantee. 
102. This limitation on State immunity in respect of 
commercial transactions is consistently maintamed in 
practically all treaties and agreements concluded not 
only by the Soviet Union but also by a host of non-
SOCIalist countries. The conglomeration of such treaty 
provisions appears to suggest a clear evidence of 
emerging State practice in favour of the practicality of 
the exception of trading as a restrictIon on State 
immunity. The emerging rules of customary interna-
tional law seem to have been crystallized in the direc-
tion of such an exception. This trend is further counten-
anced by international efforts towards codification of 
the subject under examination, some of which have 
already born fruit in the form of multilateral or regional 
conventions (see paras. 108-116 below). 
(iv) Nationa//egislation 
103. The question of jurisdiction of the courts of a 
particular country is provided for in a number of 
different t~s of legIslation, statutes, basic law or 
constitutions.217 Of greater relevancy to the current 
study is a special type of specific legislation, laws 
and decrees (lealing with jurisdictional immunities of 
foreign States in particular. It is of the greatest interest 
to note that recent legislation of this category invariably 
contains a provision with regard to the exception of 
trading activity or commercial transaction. Thus, sec-
tions 1604 and 1605 of the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act of 1976 of the United States218 provide: 
Section 1604. Immunity of a foreign state 
from jurisdiction 
Subject to existing international agreements to which the United 
216United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 240, p. 157. See the corres-
ponding provisions in treaties concluded by the USSR with other 
developinj cc:'u.ntries, such as Egypt (1956) (ibid., y~1. 687, p. 221); 
Ira9 (195H) (IbId., vol. 328, p. 118); Togo (1961) (IbId., vol. 730, p. 
187); Ghana (1961) (ibid., vol. 655, p. 171); Yemen (1963) (ibid., 
vol. 672, p. 315); Brazil (1963) (ibid., vol. 646, p. 277); Singapore 
(1966) (ibid., vol. 631, p. 125); Costa Rica (1970) (ibid., vol. 957, p. 
347); Bolivia (1970) (ibid., p. 373). The relevant provisions of these 
treaties are reproduced in English in United Nations, Materials on 
Jurisdictionallmmunities . .. , pp. 145-150. 
217See, for example, Legislative Decree No. 189 of 1 April 1952 of 
the Syrian Arab Republic (A/CN.4/343/ Add.l, pp. 1-3); and 
excerpts from relevant laws of Yugoslavia rerroduced in English in 
United Nations, Materials on Jurisdictiona Immunities ... , pp. 
69-70. 
21SSee footnote 158 above. See also United States of America, 
Department of the Treasu£¥, Internal Revenue Service, "Income of 
foreign governments: NotIce of proposed rulemaking" (Federal 
Register, vol. 43, No. 158 (15 Au~ust 1978), pp. 36111-36114); 
reproduced in United Nations, Matenals on Jurisdictional Immunities 
. .. , pp. 63 et seq. 
States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state 
shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United 
States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of 
this chapter. 
Section 1605. General exceptions to the jurisdictional 
immunity of G foreign stGte 
(G) A foreign state shall DOt be immune from the jurisdiction of 
courts of the United States or of the States in any case: 
(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried 
on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed 
in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the 
foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the 
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign 
state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United 
States; 
104. Without commenting in detail on the above 
provision, which also delineates the questions of juris-
diction that could be exercised by the courts of the 
United States or of the states, it is interesting to 
compare the provisions of similar legislation in other 
countries. The State Immunity Act 1978 of the United 
Kingdom219 contains the following provisions: 
Exceptions from immunity 
3. (1) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to: 
(G) a commercial transaction entered into by the State; or 
(b) an obligation of the State which by virtue of a contract 
(whether a commercial transaction or not) falls to be per-
formed wholly or partly in the United Kingdom. 
105. Pakistan also issued an ordinance, No. VI of 
1981, entitled the State Immunity Ordinance, 1981220 
which, like the United Kingdom State Immunity Act 
1978, contains several exceptions from immunity, one 
of which is "Commercial transactions and contracts to 
be performed in Pakistan". The relevant provision 
reads: 
5. (1) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to: 
(G) a commercial transaction entered into by the State; or 
(b) an obligation of the State which by virtue of a contract, which 
mayor may not be a commercial transaction, falls to be 
performed wholly or partly in Pakistan. 
106. The expression "commercial transaction" is de-
fined in subsection (3) as meaning: 
(G) any contract for the supply of goods or services; 
(b) any loan or other transaction for the provision of finance and 
any guarantee or indemnity in respect of any such transaction 
or of any other financial obligation; and 
(c) any other transaction or activity, whether of a commercial, 
industrial, financial, professional or other similar character, 
into which a State enters or in which it engages otherwise than 
in the exercise of its sovereign authority. 
219See footnote 188 above. See also the Stille Immunity (Overseas 
Territories) Order 1979 (United Kingdom, StGtutory Instruments 
1979, part 1, p. 1130, No. 458; reproduced in United Nations, 
MGleriGls on Jurisdictional Immunities . .. , pp. 53 et seq.), which 
gives added precision to the meaning of "territory" in connection 
with the contractual obligation to be performed by the State. 
rNlThe GGzette of Pakistan (Islamabad), 11 March 1981 (text 
reproduced in United Nations, MateriGls on JurisdictioMllmmunilies 
. . . , pp. 20 et seq.). 
107. It should be noted that similar legislation has 
recently been adopted by the Canadian Parliament221 
and Singapore222 and is being contemplated in 
Barbadosw and St. Kitts.224 Similarly, the States which 
have ratified the European Convention on State Im-
munity 1972 (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus and United 
Kingdom) have adopted internal legislation or made 
necessary declarations to give effect to the provisions of 
the Convention.22S 
3. INTER.NATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND EFFOR.TS 
TOWARDS CODIFICATION 
108. Under this heading, a brief survey will be made 
of efforts towards international codification of the topic 
or allied subject by private non-governmental circles 
as well as by governmental bodies. Recent efforts cul-
minating in international conventions deserve an early 
mention. 
(a) The European Convention on 
State Immunity (1972)226 
109. The European Convention on State Immunity, 
1972 came into force on 11 June 1976 following ratifica-
tions by Austria, Belgium and Cyprus. The United 
Kingdom is the fourth signatory to ratify. Article 7 of 
the Convention provides: 
1. A Contracting State cannot claim immunity from the jurisdic-
tion of a court of another Contracting State if it has on the territory of 
the State of the forum an office, agency or other establishment 
through which it engages, in the same manner as a private person, in 
an industrial, commercial or financial activity, and the proceedings 
relate to that activity of the office, agency or establishment. 
2. Paragraph 1 shaU not apply if all the parties to the dispute are 
States, or if the parties have otherwise agreed in writing. 
(b) The International Convention for the Unification of 
Certain Rules relating to the Immunity of State-
owned Vessels (Brussels, 1926)227 
110. The Brussels Convention of 1926, as Gilbert 
Gidel, the Rapporteur, puts it, "avait pour raison 
22ISee Canada, An Act to provide for State immunity in Canadian 
courts (StGte Immunity Act), entry into force 15 July 1982 (The 
CatuuJa GGzette, PGrt 11I (Ottawa), vol. 6, No. 15 (22 June 1982), 
p. 2949, chap. 95); section 5 of the Act provides: 
"A foreign state is not immune from the jurisdiction ot a court In 
any proceedings that relate to any commercial activity of the 
foreign state." 
222StGte Immunity Act 1979 (26 October 1979), reproduced in 
United Nations, MGleriills on JurisdictioMllmmunities . .. , pp. 28 et 
seq. 
223See the information communicated to the Secretariat by the 
Government of Barbados, ibid., pp. 74-75. 
~See Sinclair, loco cit., p. 266. 
22SSee, for example, the declarations of Austria (reproduced in 
English in United Nations, MGleriills on JurisdictioMI Immunities 
. .. ,pp.~). 
216 Council of Europe, Ewopeon Convention on S/(lJ1! Immunity 
Gnd AdditioMI Protocol, European Treaty Series, No. 74 (Stras-
bourg, 1972); and Expltuuuory Reports on the EuropeGn Convention 
on StGle Immunity IlIId the AddilioMI Protocol (Strasbourg, 1972). 
See also M. O. Wiederkehr, "La Convention euro¢enne sur 
I'immunite des Etats", AnnUGire (r~Gis de droit inter1llltioMl, 1974, 
vol. XX, Po' 925; I. M. Sinclair, "'The European Convention on State 
immunity' , The Inter1llltional ond CompGrGtive Low Quarterly 
(London), vol. 22 (1973), pp. 254. 
227League of Nations, Treoty Series, vol. CLXXVI, p. 199, and 
Additional Protocol (Brussels, 1934) (ibid., p. 215) . 
d'etre essentielle les navires publics engages dans des 
operations commerciales". 228 Its main 06ject was clear-
ly to assimilate the position of State-exploited merchant 
ships to that of private vessels of commerce in regard to 
the question of immunities. Article 1 provides: 
Seagoing vessels owned or operated by States, cargoes owned by 
them, and cargoes and passengers carried 011 government vessels, and 
the States owning or operating such vessels, or owning such cargoes, 
Ire subject in respect of claims relating to the operation of such 
vessels or the carriage of such cargoes, to the same rules of liability 
and to the same obligations as those applicable to private vessels, 
cargoes and equipments. 
(c) Regional intergovernmental bodies 
111. While the efforts of the Council of Europe 
culminated in the entry into force of the European 
Convention on State Immunity (1972), similar efforts 
have also been or are being pursued m other regions. 
The Central American States, the Inter-American 
Council and the Caribbean States have been consider-
ing similar projects.229 It is not insignificant to note the 
contribution made in this field by the Asian-African 
Legal Consultative Committee, which set up a Commit-
tee on Immunity of States in respect of Commercial and 
other Transactions of a Private Character. In 1960, the 
AALCC adopted the final report of the Committee. 
The final report records that all delegations except that 
of Indonesia ". . . were of the view that a distmction 
should be made between different types of state activity 
and immunity to forei$n states should not be granted in 
respect of their actiVities which may be called com-
mercial or of private nature". Although a final decision 
was postponed, the following recommendations were 
made: 
(i) State Trading Organisations which have a separate juristic 
entity under the Municipal Laws of the country where they are 
incorporated should not be entitled to the immunity of the state in 
respect of any of its activities in a foreign state. Such organisations 
and their representatives could be sued in the Municipal Courts of a 
foreign state in respect of their transactions or activities in their State. 
(ii) A State which enters into transactions of a commercial or 
private character ought not to raise the plea of sovereign immunity if 
sued in the courts of a foreign state in respect of such transactions. If 
the plea of immunity is raised it should not be admissible to deprive 
the jurisdiction of the Domestic Courts.230 
4. CoNTRIBUTIONS FROM NON-GOVERNMENTAL CIRCLES 
112. Reflecting in a way a clearly emerging trend in 
the opinions of writers are the results of efforts towards 
formulation of rules of international law on the subject 
by private non-governmental circles in the form of draft 
mG. Gidel, Le droit international public de /0 mer (Chateauroux, 
Mellottee, 1932), vol. II, p. 362. See also the provisions of the 1958 
Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, especially section III of 
the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Conti$uous Zone 
(United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 516, p. 214) and article 9 of the 
Convention on the High Seas (ibid., vol. 450, p. 86). 
229 See , for example, the letter of the Government of Barbados to 
the Secretariat, statin~ that it was "in the process of considering such 
legislation (as the Umted Kingdom State Immunity Act 1978) and in 
addition is spearheading efforts for a Caribbean Convention on State 
Immunity" (reproduced in United Nations, Mtllerials on Jurisdic-
tionallmmuniltes ... , pp. 74-75). 
230 Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, Report on the 
Third Session (Colombo, 20 JanUJlry to 4 Februory 1960) (New Delhi) 
(n.d.l, p. 68. See also M. M. Whiteman, Digest of Inlernalional Law 
(Was'bington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), vol. 6, 
pp. 572-574. 
codes, draft conventions and resolutions. The following 
endeavours have contributed substantially to the 
advancement of legal developments and should not 
escape present notice. 
(a) Resolutions of the Institute of 
International Law 
113. The Hamburg Draft Resolution of 1891 contains 
a provision limiting the application of immunities in 
certain cases, notably "actions relating to a commercial 
or industrial establishment or to a railway, operated by 
the foreign State in the territory". 231 A similar provi-
sion is contained in article 3 of the final draft resolution 
adopted by the Institute in 1951: 
The courts of a State may hear cases involving a foreign State 
whenever the act giving rise to the case is an acle de C011ll'Mrce*, 
similar to that of an ordinary individual, and within the meaning of 
the definition accepted in the countries involved in the case.232 
On 30 April 1954, the Institute adopted new resolutions 
on the immunity of foreign States from jurisdiction and 
execution, confirming immunity in regard to acts of 
sovereignty but upholding jurisdiction relating to an act 
which under the lex fori is not an act of sovereign 
authority. 
(b) Draft code of the International 
Law Association 
114. Article III of the Strupp draft code of 1926, 
prepared for the International Law Association, also 
enumerates certain exceptions to the doctrine of State 
immunity, including". . . especially for all cases where 
the State [or the sovereign] acts not as the holder of 
public authority, but as a person in f,rivate law, particu-
larly if it engages in commerce· . _ . '.233 More recently, 
the International Law Association took occasion to 
restudy the problem at its 45th Conference (Lucerne, 
1952); the problem is under re-examination by the 
Association. 
(c) Hatvard draft convention on competence of courts 
in regard to foreign Stales, 1932 
115. The Harvard Research Center has prepared a 
number of draft conventions and commentaries for the 
"Research in International Law" of the Harvard Law 
School. Article 11 of the Harvard draft convention on 
competence of courts in regard to forei~n States of 1932 
subjects a foreign State to local jurisdiction: 
... when, in the territory of such other State, it engages in an 
industrial, commercial, financial or other business enterprise in which 
private persons may there engage, or does an act there in connection 
231 Article 4, para. 3, of the "Projet de reglement international sur 
la competence des tribunaux dans les proces contre les Etats, 
souverains ou chefs d'Etat etrangers" (Institute of International Law. 
Tableau general des resolutions (1873-1956) (Basel, 1957). pp. 14-
15). 
232 AnnUJlire de l'lnstitut de droit international, 1952 (Basel), vol. 
44, part I, p. 37. The expression "gestion patrimoniale", used in the 
origmal draft, was replaced by the term "actes de commerce", which, 
according to Niboyet, was more in keeping with the modem activity 
of the State (ibid., p. 131) and "with it, one is on relatively firm and 
familiar ground" (Traite (op. cit.), vol. VI, part 1, p. 350); see also 
footnote 104 above. 
233K. Strupp, "Reforme et codification du droit international: 
Projet d'une convention sur I'immunite en droit international", 
International Law Association, Rq?ort of the Thirty-fourth Confer-
ence (VielllUl, 1926) (London, 1927), pp. 426 et seq. 
:} 
JurIIdktioDaIlmmanities or States and their property 
respect of a trading or commercial activity of another 
State even though it may be partly or wholly carried on 
in the latter's territory. 
(b) Increasingly, there appears to be stronger sup-
port and justification for. disallowing immunity and 
therefore for the court of one State to exercise its 
territorial competence or subject-matter jurisdiction as 
respects the activities of another State in a commercial, 
industrial or financial field. 
(c) The problem of defining the notion of "trading or 
commercial activity" is one that seems difficult to avoid 
in this particular connection, although on earlier occa-
sions in relation to diplomatic immunities289 and regula-
tion of international trade290 there appears to have been 
no compelling necessity for such a definition, as a 
general notion of trade is well understood. On the 
other hand, other endeavours, notably the Harvard 
draft291 and national legislation such as the Pakistan 
State Immunity Ordinance, 1981,292 have found it use-
ful to insert a provision on use of terms or a definition 
provision. The expression necessarily covers a single 
Isolated transaction, such as a contract of sale or 
purchase of goods or services, as well as a series of acts 
or a course of conduct, or the operation of a business 
enterprise or organization. 
289There was no definition provision in regard to the private 
trading activities of a diplomatic agent in the 1961 Vienna Conven-
tion on Diplomatic Relations (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 
500, p. 95), either in article 31 of the convention or in the commen-
tary to draft article 29 proposed by the Commission (Yearbook . .. 
1958, vol. II, pp. 98-99, document A/3859). 
290There was found to be no necessity for a definition of "State 
trading enterprise" in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, vol. IV (Sales 
No.: GATT/I969-1». The wider term "public commercial enter-
prise" as defined by article 54 of the Havana Charter of 1947 refers to 
agencies of government engaging in trade as well as to trading 
enterprises referred to in article 46 in connection with restrictive 
business practices. Article 29, paras. 1-2, of the Charter distinguish 
between ordinary sales and purchases, and imports of products 
purchased for governmental purposes not with a VIew to commercial 
resale. (For the text of the Cliarter, see United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Employment, Havana, 21 November 1947-24 March 1948, 
Final Act and Related Documents (E/CONF.2/78), sect. II.) 
29ISee article 11 of the Harvard draft, op. cit., p. 597 (see footnote 
33 above). 
292See section 5, subsection (3) of the Ordinance (see paras. 
10>-106 and footnote 220 above). 
(d) Even with a well-defined concept of trading or 
commercial activity, there may still be a need for the 
adoption of further criteria to identify or facilitate the 
deSignation or classification of an activity as "trading or 
commercial" by reference either to the nature of the 
activity, or to its p'urpose, or to both the nature and the 
purpose, primanly the nature and if need be also the 
underlying public or governmental object of a particu-
lar activity or transaction. 293 
(e) Another practical test consists in the assimilation 
of the position of a State to that of a private person or 
enterprise carrying on a trade or busmess in the terri-
tory of another State. Implied consent or implied 
waiver of immunity has also been advanced as an added 
justification for an assimilative theory. 
(f) The idea of profit-making or speculation of 
lucrative gains is not altogether alien to the notion of 
trade or commerce, although it is not always a realiz-
able condition of fact. A further question that can be 
pertinently asked relates to the extent, if any, to which 
the notion of profit can be considered relevant to the 
determination of the non-pUblic character or the pri-
vate and commercial nature of a transaction or 
activity.294 
(g) Reciprocity has furnished a further justification 
for mutual limitation of State immunity in respect of 
trading. 
2. TEXT OF DRAFT ARTICLE 12 
121. Draft article 12 reads as follows: 
Article 12 .. Trading or commercial activity 
1. In the absence of agreement to the contrary, a 
State is not immune from the jurisdiction of another 
State in respect of proceedings relating to any trading or 
commercial activity conducted by it, partly or wboDy in 
the territory of that other State, being an activity in 
which private persons or entities may there engage; 
2. Paragrapb 1 does not apply to transactions con-
cluded between States, nor to contracts concluded on a 
government-to-government basis. 
293See draft article 2, para. 1(f) (footnote 9 above), and draft 
article 3, para. 2 (footnote 10 above). 
294See, for example, article 26 of the Harvard draft, op. cit., p. 716. 
